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FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN REAL ESTATE
FINANCE: PREEMPTION AND FEDERAL
COMMON LAW
FRANK S. ALEXANDER*
Historically, real property law has been the exclusive do-
main of the states. This autonomy inevitably bred tremendous
diversity in the laws that affect real estate finance. Over the last
sixty years, however, the federal government has become increas-
ingly involved in real estate finance, both as a regulator and a
market participant. The courts have been forced to rely on the
doctrines of implied preemption and federal common law to de-
termine when and to what extent federal law should displace di-
verse state real estate finance laws and impose uniformity. The
result has been chaos.
In this Article Professor Alexander describes the history of
diversity in state real estate finance laws, surveys the growth of
federal involvement in real estate finance, and exposes the incon-
sistent and unpredictable results courts have reached in applying
preemption analysis in many critical areas. He blames the mul-
tifactored analysis under the doctrines of implied preemption
and federal common law for this confusion. He asserts that the
present analysis affords traditional state concerns too little
weight. Professor Alexander proposes a new approach to preemp-
tion analysis premised on the functional difference between fed-
eral regulation of real estate finance and federal participation in
the real estate market.
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The law of real estate finance is in the midst of its most significant
transformation in centuries. An area of law historically within the prov-
ince of state autonomy and control, real estate finance laws have become
subject to increasing economic pressures for national uniformity. In re-
cent decades federal law has become an element of virtually every mort-
gage transaction. The pressure for uniformity and this increased federal
intervention raise the issue of what law governs real estate finance.
There is no doubt that Congress can, by express declaration, dis-
place state laws governing real estate transactions. It has expressly man-
dated minimum disclosure requirements; it has expressly limited states'
authority to regulate substantive issues such as usury and adjustable rate
mortgages. There is also little doubt that Congress can make the federal
government a direct participant in the real estate finance market. Fed-
eral agencies serve as primary real estate lenders; they insure and guaran-
tee loans; they purchase and "securitize" loans on the secondary
mortgage market; they act as receivers for loan portfolios of insolvent
financial institutions.
When Congress expressly displaces state laws by market regulation
of real estate finance, there may be questions about the wisdom or effi-
cacy of such legislation, but the requirements and effect of such laws are
generally clear. When, however, Congress has not spoken directly and
clearly on the question of the applicable law, the judiciary must deter-
mine whether a federal rule should supplant state law, and, if so, the
content of such a rule. Faced with a multitude of criteria upon which to
draw and two distinct constitutional doctrines-implied preemption and
federal common law-upon which to base its reasoning, the judiciary has
reached entirely inconsistent and unpredictable conclusions.
The dilemma is threefold. First, federal laws in real estate finance
are not being written on a clean slate. Over the past two centuries each
state has developed its own complex and interdependent system of allo-
cating the rights and duties of creditors and debtors in secured real estate
finance transactions. No two states have identical mortgage laws. Sec-
ond, although national uniformity may be desirable for the efficient oper-
ation of the real estate finance market, imposition of a uniform rule
affecting one particular issue (for example, the availability of nonjudicial
foreclosure or the existence of a statutory right of redemption) may sig-
nificantly alter the delicate balance of creditors' and debtors' rights in
one jurisdiction while having little or no effect in other jurisdictions. Per-
haps for this reason all attempts thus far to adopt uniform or model
mortgage laws have been resoundingly unsuccessful. Third, the very na-
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ture of federal involvement in real estate finance has been ambivalent and
ambiguous. Although enacted in part to achieve nationally uniform
laws, much of the recent congressional action expressly permits individ-
ual states to reject the federal rule and retain their own laws or to impose
their own requirements in addition to federal law. When federal agencies
participate in real estate finance, usually as creditors, they rely upon state
laws for protection of the security yet seek to avoid state laws which
impose constraints on creditor's rights.
Part II of this Article analyzes the wide diversity among the states
in key areas of real estate finance law. One of the few characteristics of
mortgage law common to all jurisdictions in the United States is the con-
tinuing tension between protection of a debtor's right to possess and con-
trol the property and recognition of a creditor's right to foreclose and
maximize recovery of the debt. The history of mortgage law is the story
of swings between creditors' and debtors' rights. Creditors' preference
for the defeasible fee was tempered by the rise of the equity of redemp-
tion. The uncertainty of the exercise of redemption led to the creditor's
right to foreclose. The harshness of strict foreclosure was partially ame-
liorated by foreclosure sales, but creditors were able to achieve expedited
nonjudicial sales. The price inadequacy of nonjudicial foreclosure sales
was countered with statutory rights of redemption and antideficiency leg-
islation. Each state has reached a different compromise between these
competing goals, and efforts to achieve a nationally uniform real estate
finance law have been completely unsuccessful.
Part III examines the growth of federal involvement in real estate
finance. Largely a phenomenon of the last few decades, congressional
action has taken the form of both market regulation and market partici-
pation. The breadth and depth of such action are reflected in two facts.
First, for certain purposes virtually every residential mortgage loan in the
United States is a "federally related mortgage" subject to federal require-
ments. Second, federal agencies and federally related entities are the
largest holders of mortgage loans in the country.
In light of this expansive scope of federal participation, Part IV of
this Article surveys judicial determinations of whether state law or fed-
eral law governs in specific substantive areas. When Congress has not
expressly declared the law applicable to federal loan programs, courts
have reached inconsistent and unpredictable conclusions.
A primary reason for this chaos is that courts use two separate, yet
overlapping, constitutional doctrines to decide the question of what law
governs in cases involving federal loan programs. The most commonly
used approach is that of implied preemption: Did Congress intend to
displace state law and create a separate federal rule to govern the trans-
[Vol. 71296
REAL ESTATE FINANCE
action? As a form of statutory construction, an implied preemption anal-
ysis normally draws upon multiple factors to determine whether
preemption of state law is necessary or desirable. Two decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in the 1960s, which have been the basis for
much of the subsequent litigation, reflect the problems inherent in a dis-
cretionary multifactored analysis. In United States v. Shimer,1 the Court
held that a federal agency regulation "was intended to provide the whole
and exclusive source of protection of the interests of the Veterans Ad-
ministration as guarantor and was, to this extent, meant to displace in-
consistent state law."2 A few years later, in response to the question
whether Texas law of coverture was binding on the Small Business Ad-
ministration, the Court concluded, in United States v. Yazell,3 that state
law remained controlling. This opinion emphasized that the particular
loan in question was individually negotiated (hence not part of any na-
tionally uniform program), and that there was no statutory, regulatory,
or contractual indication that state law would not apply.4 The Court
expressly rejected the argument that the federal government's financial
interests should be exempt from the disparities in state laws.'
The second constitutional doctrine used as a basis for decisions in-
volving federal real estate finance programs is federal common law.
Broad in its scope and diverse in its application, the doctrine of federal
common law provides that, in certain circumstances, rights and remedies
created by the federal judiciary constitute the governing law and displace
inconsistent state law. One particular branch of federal common law
doctrine holds that when the federal government is itself a party to a
proceeding, courts have the authority to decide (in the absence of express
congressional declaration) what law governs the transaction. Derived
from the Supreme Court decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States,6 and subsequently developed in United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc.,7 this expression of federal common law encompasses two distinct
propositions. First, when the federal government is a party to a transac-
tion, federal courts have the authority to establish the governing law.
Second, courts have discretion either to establish an applicable rule in-
dependent of what state law provides, or to adopt a particular state law
as the governing law. Selection of the governing law depends upon
1. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
2. Id. at 381.
3. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
4. Id. at 344-48, 350-51.
5. Id. at 354.
6. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
7. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
19931
298 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
whether there is a need for a nationally uniform body of law, whether
application of state law would frustrate objectives of the federal program,
and whether application of federal rules would disrupt commercial rela-
tionships based on state law.8
Early in the growth of federal participation in real estate finance the
majority of judicial decisions concluded, either on the basis of Shimer
and implied preemption,9 or by superficial application of federal common
law,"0 that federal law displaced state law. As federal participation has
become more extensive and the impact of possible displacement of state
law more carefully considered, judicial decisions have split widely on the
question.11 The availability of these dual constitutional doctrines, each
8. Id. at 728-29.
9. Of fifteen opinions rendered between 1953 and 1968, United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S.
341 (1966), was the only one that held in favor of state law. See id. at 352. In the remaining
fourteen, the courts decided that state law was not applicable to the federal program. See
United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381 (1961) (VA regulations preempt state law); United
States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 1968) (VA deficiency action permitted notwith-
standing state law); Clark Inv. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 7, 9 (9th Cir. 1966) (federal law
governs application of rents during redemption period); Herlong-Sierra Homes, Inc. v. United
States, 358 F.2d 300, 300 (9th Cir.) (FHA loan not subject to state antideficiency law), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 919 (1966); United States v. Rossi, 342 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1965) (VA
deficiency action permitted on basis of indemnity and need for uniformity); United States v.
Chester Park Apts., Inc., 332 F.2d 1, 4-5 (8th Cir.) (federal law governs appointment of re-
ceiver pending FHA foreclosure), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); United States v. Sommer-
ville, 324 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir. 1963) (FmHA policies govern sale of collateral), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 909 (1964); United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1963) (FHA not bound
by state coverture law); United States v. Queen's Court Apts., Inc., 296 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir.
1961) (FHA entitled to hold reserve and replacement funds); United States v. View Crest
Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 381-82 (9th Cir.) (federal law applies to FHA receivership
petition), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959); McKnight v. United States, 259 F.2d 540, 544 (9th
Cir. 1958) (VA deficiency action permitted on basis of indemnity); United States v. Montgom-
ery, 268 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Kan. 1967) (state statutory redemption period preempted by
SBA program); United States v. Jones, 155 F. Supp. 52, 54-55 (M.D. Ga. 1957) (VA deficiency
action permitted on basis of indemnity); United States v. Henderson, 121 F. Supp. 343, 344
(S.D. Iowa 1953) (VA deficiency action permitted on basis of indemnity and need for
uniformity).
10. Courts frequently relied upon the rationale of Clearfield Trust in holding that feder-
ally insured or guaranteed mortgage programs are not subject to state law requirements once
the mortgage is owned by the government. See, e.g., Wells, 403 F.2d at 598; Chester Park
Apt&, 332 F.2d at 3; Sommerville, 324 F.2d at 714; Helz, 314 F.2d at 303; View Crest Garden
Apts., 268 F.2d at 382. Several of the initial cases which addressed the question whether state
laws applied to actions arising out of federally insured loan programs concluded, with little
analysis of possible preemption, that state laws protecting debtors were not binding on the
federal government. See, e.g., McKnight, 259 F.2d at 544; Jones, 155 F. Supp. at 54-55; Hen-
derson, 121 F. Supp. at 344.
11. Four recent appellate court decisions reflect the inconsistent analyses and results,
based upon implied preemption and federal common law, of the past twenty years. Compare
United States v. Davis, 961 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that VA loan regulations
displace state law) and Jones v. Turnage, 699 F. Supp. 795, 800-02 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (same),
aff'd sub. nom. Jones v. Derwinski, 914 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1496
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having a fluid, multifactored analysis, has compounded the confusion.
Part V of this Article analyzes implied preemption and federal com-
mon law in the context of real estate finance. Such an analysis, in com-
prehensive form, has not been undertaken previously and is long
overdue. It evaluates each of the criteria underlying the doctrines in
terms of the diversity in real estate finance laws throughout the states,
and the significance of national uniformity by and for the federal govern-
ment in this field. The present formulations of implied preemption and
federal common law cannot bear the normative and analytical weight
expected of them. Too often courts equate the omnipresence of the fed-
eral role with omniscience about the purpose and effect of state real es-
tate finance laws, and consequently reject historic state concerns.
Part VI proposes a significantly revised analysis to provide clarity
and predictability in real estate finance. The recommended approach
draws upon the distinctive functions of market regulation and market
participation, and significantly narrows the discretionary displacement of
state law by federal law solely on the grounds that the federal govern-
ment is a party. The suggested approach similarly modifies criteria for
application of implied preemption by requiring the courts to focus on the
impact of preemption on related state laws, a criterion traditionally ab-
sent from implied preemption analysis.
II. REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAws: A HISTORY OF DIVERSITY
For two hundred years the laws pertaining to real estate finance
have reflected tremendous diversity among the states. Whether viewed
as a leading example of states' autonomy in the face of federalism, as a
striking example of the effect cultural influences have in the formation of
state laws, or even simply as a consequence of radically different eco-
nomic and social contexts, each state has followed a different path in the
development of laws governing the relationship of debtors and creditors
in secured real estate transactions.
Real estate finance is most easily understood in three different stages
that parallel the life of a mortgage.12 The first stage concerns the nature
of the instrument itself, the interest which is conveyed, and the corre-
(1991) with Regan v. United States Small Business Admin., 926 F.2d 1078, 1081 (11th Cir.
1991) (holding that state laws should apply to Small Business Administration guaranties) and
Whitehead v. Derwinski, 904 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that state antideficiency
laws apply to VA loans).
12. Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term "mortgage" is used throughout this
Article in the generic sense of an instrument transferring an interest in real property for the
purpose of securing an obligation. In such usage it is intended to include mortgages, deeds of
trust, and security deeds in their more technical contexts.
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sponding rights and duties of the parties in the event of default. The
second stage focuses on foreclosure-the method by which the creditor
may take, or force a sale of, the security following default. The third
stage, most recent in its historical development, addresses the relative
rights and duties of the debtor and creditor after foreclosure. In each of
these three stages no two states are completely alike in the allocation of
rights and duties.
A. Variations in the Nature of the Mortgage
The first stage in the life of a mortgage concerns the structure of the
transaction. Originating as the real property equivalent of a pledge of
personal property, the mortgage derived from the twelfth century gage in
which property was transferred to the possession of a creditor and the
creditor was permitted to receive the rents and profits of the land in pay-
ment of the debt. 13 As disputes emerged over the rights of a debtor to
redeem its property from the obligation and the rights of a creditor to
terminate the debtor's interests in the property, two distinct approaches
developed. The first approach held that the security instrument consti-
tuted transfer of legal title to the property to the creditor (the "title"
theory), while the second held that the security instrument only consti-
tuted a lien on the property, and not a transfer of title (the "lien" theory).
The title theory of mortgages follows directly from the early devel-
opment of the defeasible fee as a substitute for the gage.4 The security
instrument was a fee simple conveyance with the condition that if the
debtor repaid the indebtedness by a specified date the creditor would re-
convey the property to the debtor. If the debtor failed to make such
repayment by the specified date, the creditor would hold the property in
fee simple absolute. 5
The lien theory of mortgages emerged when courts of equity began
to protect debtors by permitting redemption of the property from the
debt despite the passage of the due date in the security instrument. Such
protection became known as the "equity of redemption" and is perhaps
the sole feature common to the law of mortgages in every jurisdiction
13. THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COM-
MONLY CALLED GLANVILL 120-26 (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans., 1965) [hereinafter GLANVILL].
The late medieval development of the mortgage is explored at length in Harold D. Hazeltine,
The Gage of Land in Medieval England, 17 HARV. L. REV. 549, 549-57 (1904), and John H.
Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas, 10 HARv. L. REV. 321, 326-
40 (1897). See Frank S. Alexander, Mortgage Prepayment: The Trial of Common Sense, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 288, 290-98 (1987).
14. William F. Walsh, Development of the Title and Lien Theories of Mortgages, 9 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 280, 291-96 (1932).
15. 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 129-30 (3d ed. 1923).
[Vol. 71
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today.16 In every jurisdiction the only method by which a creditor can
force a termination of the debtor's equity of redemption is foreclosure,
and in equity the debtor remains the owner of the property until foreclo-
sure. Thus, "[t]he legal ownership is vested in the creditor; but, in eq-
uity, the mortgagor remains the actual owner, until he is debarred by his
own default, or by judicial decree."17 Although the intervention of eq-
uity itself did not recharacterize mortgages from titles to liens,"i by 1781
the functional limitations on the title theory prompted Lord Mansfield's
observation, "It is an affront to common sense to say the mortgagor is
not the real owner." 19
Characterization of a mortgage as either a conveyance of a lien or
conveyance of legal title has been a source of confusion going far beyond
the method of terminating the equity of redemption. From the sixteenth
to the nineteenth centuries, unresolved questions included: (1) whether
the respective interests of the mortgagor and mortgagee constituted real
property or personal property for purposes of inheritance;2" (2) whether
the mortgagor's interest (the equity of redemption) could be subject to
levy and sale, and, correspondingly, whether the mortgagee's security in-
terest itself could be subject to liens; 21 (3) whether homestead rights or
marital rights such as dower and curtesy applied to a mortgage;22
(4) whether mortgaged property must be exonerated by a decedent's es-
tate;23 (5) whether, and when, a mortgagee could take possession of the
16. Because the equity of redemption evolved from a long series of Chancery Court deci-
sions, it is not possible to point to a specific date for its initial recognition. The substantive
development of this doctrine is found most clearly in a series of cases decided by Lord Chan-
cellor Nottingham in the late seventeenth century. Howard v. Harris, 23 Eng. Rep. 406, 408
(Ch. 1683); Talbot v. Braddill, 23 Eng. Rep. 402, 402-03 (Ch. 1683), aff'd on reh'g, 23 Eng.
Rep. 539 (Ch. 1686). The most comprehensive single study of redemption is R. W. TURNER,
THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION (1931).
17. 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *136 (12th ed. 1873).
It is true, that in discussions in Courts of Equity, a mortgage is sometimes called
a lien for a debt. And so it certainly is, and something more; it is a transfer of the
property itself, as security for the debt. This must be admitted to be true at law; and
it is equally true in equity; for in this respect equity follows the law.
Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 441 (1828).
18. William H. Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien Theory, 32 YALE L.J. 233, 235
(1923).
19. King v. St. Michaels, 99 Eng. Rep. 399, 400 (K.B. 1781); see Lloyd, supra note 18, at
237.
20. RICHARD HOLMES COOTE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGE *566-91
(1837); 1 JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 438-58 (1799).
21. 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 277-80, 406-17 (1864); 4 KENT,
supra note 17, at *161.
22. 1 HILLIARD, supra note 21, at 420-21; 2 POWELL, supra note 20, at 701-35.
23. COOTE, supra note 20, at *457-509; 2 POWELL, supra note 20, at 803-956.
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property before foreclosure;24 and (6) whether the creditor must recon-
vey the mortgaged property upon full payment by the debtor, or whether
the mortgage became a nullity upon such payment.25 In light of this
range of issues and divergent pressures, it is not surprising that the vari-
ous states reached different conclusions. 6
This differential treatment of mortgages at law and in equity lies at
the foundation of the distinctions between title theory states and lien the-
ory states. States that desired to protect the debtor's control over the
property, or at least to render the debtor's estate complete for purposes
of alienation, inheritance, and attachment by third party creditors, fa-
vored the lien theory approach because it maximized the debtor's control
and minimized the creditor's exposure.27 States that desired to protect
the creditor's ability to control the property upon default and obtain a
quick foreclosure favored the title theory approach, which maximized
the creditor's options and minimized the debtor's rights. By the latter
part of the nineteenth century, eighteen states followed a title theory ap-
24. 4 KENT, supra note 17, at *164; 1 POWELL, supra note 20, at 23-76.
25. Compare Farmers' Fire Ins. & Loan Co. v. Edwards, 26 Wend. 541, 543-44 (N.Y.
1841) (payment extinguishes mortgage without need for deed of reconveyance) with Parsons v.
Welles, 17 Mass. 419, 427 (1821) (deed of reconveyance required). See COOTE, supra note 20,
at *8.
26. Because the characterization of a jurisdiction as a lien theory or title theory state
depends upon the conclusion reached with respect to anywhere from eight to thirty separate
legal questions, it is not surprising that commentators could reach different conclusions.
"[T]he only guiding generalization through the morass which can be ventured safely is that the
necessity and desirability of according to the mortgagee various legal incidents of title for
security purposes will consciously or unconsciously influence the court in deciding whether the
mortgagee has them or not." 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 33 (1952). One of the most
recent conclusions has been that "[t]he substantial majority of states follow the lien theory of
mortgages." GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.2,
at 145 (2d ed. 1985). The fact that some states may change their own identification from lien
theory to title theory, or the reverse, or recognize multiple approaches simultaneously, does
not make the task any easier. For example, one commentator, in 1878, and the National
Conference of Commissioners, in 1922, classified Georgia as a lien theory state. See 1 LEO-
NARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY 23 (1878);
1922 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS 280 [hereinafter 1922 HANDBOOK]. For most legal issues Georgia did, in fact, follow
the lien theory approach until the Civil War Reconstruction Period, when statutes were en-
acted increasing significantly the rights of the mortgagees and adopting the "Deed to Secure
Debt" as the instrument of conveyance. By the early twentieth century it was clear that the
title theory approach was not only permissible in Georgia but predominant as a matter of
practice, even though separate statutory authorization for mortgages (as liens only) continued
to exist. See FRANK S. ALEXANDER, GEORGIA REAL ESTATE FORECLOSURE LAW 12-32
(1990).
27. One commentator concluded that mortgages, under the lien theory perspective, were
in function nothing more than a contractually enforceable power of sale upon default. Bernard
C. Gavit, Under the Lien Theory of Mortgages is the Mortgage Only a Power of Sale?, 15 MINN.
L. REV. 147, 148 (1931).
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proach, another eighteen states followed a lien theory approach, and six
other states adopted a blend of the two approaches.2" The title theory
approach predominated east of the Mississippi, while New York and
most of the mid-western and western states and territories followed the
lien theory approach. Fifty years later there were twenty-seven lien the-
ory states, seventeen "estate" theory states, and nine states utilizing the
intermediate "Deed of Trust"; at least four states permitted multiple
approaches.29
The most significant issue dividing title and lien theory states was
the creditor's right to possession of the land before foreclosure.
Although the late medieval gage contemplated possession by the creditor
from the outset of the mortgage,30 by the middle of the seventeenth cen-
tury the custom, if not the underlying contract, permitted the debtor to
remain in possession of the property until default.31 The dividing line
between the title and lien theories occurred with the debtor's default.
Could the creditor demand immediate possession of the property upon
default, or did he have to await foreclosure?
Historically, the title theory, with its premise of a transfer of title to
the mortgagee, affirmed the rights of the mortgagee to possession, as well
as to rents and profits, immediately upon default.3" In contrast, lien the-
ory jurisdictions denied a mortgagee an action in ejectment against the
mortgagor; the mortgagee could obtain protection of the rents and profits
only through foreclosure or the appointment of a receiver.33 Throughout
the nineteenth century, most states enacted statutes which addressed this
issue; several jurisdictions (frequently labelled the "intermediate theory"
states) expressly granted the mortgagor the right of possession until de-
fault and gave the mortgagee the right thereafter.34
B. Variations in Foreclosure Procedures
From the perspective of both the debtor and the creditor, the second
stage in the life of a mortgage, the timing and method of foreclosure of
28. 1 JONES, supra note 26, at 36-38.
29. 1922 HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 280.
30. Hazeltine, supra note 13, at 549. In the vivum vadium, the "living gage," rents and
profits during the creditor's possession were applied against the indebtedness, while in the
mortuum vadium, the "dead gage," such income to the creditor did not reduce the indebted-
ness. See GLANVILL, supra note 13, at 124.
31. Walsh, supra note 14, at 292.
32. 1 POWELL, supra note 20, at 225-27.
33. Edgar N. Durfee, The Lien or Equitable Theory of the Mortgage--Some Generaliza-
tions, 10 MICH. L. REv. 587, 603-04 (1912); Walsh, supra note 14, at 292.
34. See Robert Kratovil, Mortgages-Problems in Possession, Rents, and Mortgagee Lia-
bility, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 6 (1961).
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the equity of redemption, is frequently the most significant aspect of the
secured transaction. By the American Revolution the debtor's right of
redemption had become so established in equity by the English Chancery
Courts that foreclosure, in one form or another, became the sole method
of terminating a debtor's interest.
An early response to the use of the defeasible fee as the mortgage
instrument was "strict foreclosure," a process by which a date was estab-
lished for payment of the debt and upon passage of the date the title to
the property vested absolutely in the creditor. 6 While strict foreclosure
is still available in limited circumstances in a few jurisdictions today,
37
the possibility of a large disparity between the amount of the debt and the
value of the property led every state to adopt, by the close of the nine-
teenth century, foreclosure by sale. 8
What has divided the various states since the late nineteenth century
is whether foreclosure of the equity of redemption requires a judicially
authorized sale, or whether a contractually authorized power of sale is
sufficient. It has long been within the inherent powers of a court of eq-
uity to order a sale of the mortgaged premises,39 and -many jurisdictions,
following the merger of law and equity, enacted statutes specifically au-
thorizing foreclosure by sale procedures.' England recognized the valid-
ity of the contractually authorized power of sale in 1860. Jurisdictions
in the United States quickly followed suit either by statutory affirmation
of such a power42 or by judicial enforcement of the power of sale under
35. See TURNER, supra note 16, at 83.
36. See 2 HILLIARD, supra note 21, at 31-32.
37. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-15 (West 1978 & Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 4528 (1973).
38. 2 JONES, supra note 26, at 290-342; see 1 HILLIARD, supra note 21, at 128. In some
American jurisdictions the foreclosure procedures were considered so vital that they were set
forth in detail in the original state judiciary acts following the Revolution. See, e.g., Act of
Dec. 9, 1790, No. 438, § VII (Judiciary Act of Georgia of 1790), in ROBERT WATKINS &
GEORGE WATKINS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 422, 424 (1800).
39. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1026 (2d ed.
1839). By statute enacted in 1852, England clarified the procedures to be followed in equity by
specifying the availability of a judicially ordered sale of the premises upon such terms as the
court deemed appropriate. 15 & 16 Vict., ch. 86, § 48 (1852) (Eng.). Prior to this time fore-
closures by powers of sale were "of too doubtful a complexion to be relied on as the source of
an irredeemable title." I POWELL, supra note 20, at 19.
40. Notwithstanding the trend toward codification of the foreclosure sale requirements,
the wide differences among the jurisdictions prompted one commentator to urge the adoption
of a uniform system among the states in 1878. 2 JONES, supra note 26, at 290 n.l.
41. 23 & 24 Vict., ch. 145 (1860) (Eng.).
42. 2 JONES, supra note 26, at 557; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 2932 (West 1974) (enacted




By the early twentieth century there were thus wide variations
among the states in the methods of foreclosing a mortgage: judicial fore-
closure (at law or in equity) without statutory requirements (sixteen
states), judicial foreclosure (at law or in equity) with statutory require-
ments (twelve states), nonjudicial foreclosure by power of sale, with min-
imal statutory requirements (eleven states), and nonjudicial foreclosure
with significant statutory requirements (six states).' In 1984, approxi-
mately thirty-two jurisdictions permitted some form of nonjudicial power
of sale foreclosure.45
Statutory requirements applicable to power of sale foreclosures have
usually included notice to the mortgagor, publication of notice of the sale
for a specified period of time, specification of the contents of the notice of
sale, restrictions on the time and place of sales, and, in some jurisdic-
tions, a requirement that sale prices equal fair market value. Even where
these requirements have existed, however, no two states have followed
identical patterns. The length of time required to complete a nonjudicial
foreclosure varied, in 1922, from as little as a few days to over several
months, exclusive of any post-foreclosure right of redemption.46
C. Post-Foreclosure Requirements
The completion of a foreclosure sale begins the third stage in the
allocation of rights among secured creditors and debtors. Many jurisdic-
tions have extended to debtors an additional period of time, post-foreclo-
sure, in which to redeem the property from the debt or have restricted a
creditor's right to sue for a deficiency.
Although a nonjudicial power of sale foreclosure permits a creditor
to avoid the costly and time-consuming effects of a judicial foreclosure by
selling the debtor's property shortly after default, the "forced sale" char-
acteristic of this nonjudicial foreclosure has caused significant concern.
Largely because such a sale rarely, if ever, achieves the fair market price
for the property, and therefore results in a significant loss of equity to a
43. See, e.g., Robenson v. Vason, 37 Ga. 66, 79-80 (1867).
44. 1922 HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 280.
45. Jack Jones & J. Michael Ivens, Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee: A Section 1983
Trap, 51 TENN. L. REV. 279, 293 n.118 (1984). A different study concluded that 19 states
explicitly or implicitly recognized only judicial foreclosure, while 31 states permitted nonjudi-
cial foreclosure. Patrick B. Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statutory Redemption: The
Soundness of Iowa's Traditional Preference for Protection over Credit, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1, 4-5
& n.8 (1985).
46. 1922 HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 258.
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debtor, a number of jurisdictions have created by statute an additional
post-foreclosure period for redemption by the debtor.
The different approaches to post-foreclosure rights of redemption
mirror the diversity among the jurisdictions in foreclosure procedures.
By 1922, approximately thirty-two states provided for some statutory re-
demption period, varying from six to eighteen months. 47 Some states
shifted the right of redemption to a specified period before the foreclo-
sure sale, while others required both a substantial period of time for re-
demption before the sale as well as after the sale." In 1985
approximately twenty-nine states continued to have some form of statu-
tory redemption rights, but the scope of such redemption rights was not
consistent. 49 In some jurisdictions the post-foreclosure rights of redemp-
tion apply to all mortgage foreclosures; in others they apply only to judi-
cial foreclosures; in yet others they apply only to nonjudicial power of
sale foreclosures.5"
A separate but related issue concerns whether a debtor is liable for
any amounts due a creditor in excess of the amount realized at foreclo-
sure. Here again states have adopted widely divergent approaches.
Some jurisdictions prohibit deficiency actions entirely in certain circum-
stances, when the transaction involves a purchase money mortgage,5 or
in all situations involving exercise of a power of sale foreclosure,52 effec-
tively rendering the underlying promissory notes in these situations non-
recourse debt. Other jurisdictions tie the right to bring a deficiency
action to a finding that the foreclosure sale resulted in fair market
value; 3 still others require that the creditor file an action for liability on
the note simultaneously with an action for foreclosure.
5 4
47. Id. at 280.
48. Id.
49. Patrick B. Bauer, Statutory Redemption Reconsidered. The Operation of Iowa's Re-
demption Statute in Two Counties Between 1881 and 1980, 70 IowA L. REV. 343, 345-46
(1985).
50. Id. at 345 n. 11. The effectiveness of statutory rights of redemption in protecting
against foreclosure sales prices far below fair market value has been the subject of continuing
debate, with studies suggesting that redemption occurs in less than 10% of foreclosure sales.
Id. at 350; Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in
Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 854 n.57 (1980) (citing William C.
Prather, Foreclosure of the Security Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L. REV. 420, 452 (suggesting mort-
gages rarely redeem from sale)); Terry Schaplaw, Comment, Oregon's Statutory Right of Re-
demption-Any Redeeming Qualities?, 16 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 891, 915 (1980).
51. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-21.38 (1991).
52. See, eg., MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24,100
(West 1989).
53. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161 (1982).
54. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 26, § 8.2, at 598-600.
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D. Attempts at Uniformity
By the early part of the twentieth century it was clear that no two
states had chosen identical paths for allocating rights among debtors and
creditors in real estate finance." As real estate finance became increas-
ingly national in scope, pressures began to mount for uniformity among
jurisdictions. The most extensive, and least successful, effort to achieve
uniformity has been through attempts to draft uniform or model laws for
voluntary enactment by each state. Congressional actions to impose uni-
formity expressly and directly have been more limited in scope.
In the face of the differences among the states, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began work in 1911 on a
uniform mortgage law.5 6 It considered initial drafts in 1921"7 and
1922,58 and debated the proposed uniform law in detail in 1925."9 When
considered on a section-by-section basis, each section received an affirma-
tive vote, but when considered in its entirety, the proposed uniform law
was defeated by a vote of nineteen to fourteen." The following year the
uniform mortgage law again came under review.61 In 1927, the Uniform
Real Estate Mortgage Act was overwhelmingly approved.62 It had as its
55. An example cited in 1927 was that in Kansas City, Missouri, a mortgage could be
foreclosed in three weeks, without any subsequent redemption period, while across the river in
Kansas City, Kansas, judicial foreclosure was required, with an 18 month right of redemption
following foreclosure. 1927 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSION-
ERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 656-57 [hereinafter 1927 HANDBOOK].
56. 1911 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 185; see Jon W. Bruce, The Role Uniform Real Property Acts Have Played
in the Development of American Land Law: Some General Observations, 27 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 331, 331-32, 336-41 (1992).
57. 1921 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 245-65.
58. 1922 HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 253.
59. 1925 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 169-75, 176-78, 217-18 [hereinafter 1925 HANDBOOK].
60. Id. at 301-03. The 1925 defeat of the proposed Uniform Mortgage Law was, no
doubt, a serious blow to its chief advocate, Nathan MacChesney, who at the time was serving
his final year as the tenth president of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Id. at 6. MacChesney was also general counsel of the National Association of
Real Estate Boards. 1927 HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 664.
61. 1926 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 125.
62. 1927 HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 195-96. During the brief period of time between
the initial defeat of the uniform law and its subsequent adoption, considerable institutional
support was given to its passage. Real estate licensing boards, title insurance companies, mort-
gage companies, and local bar associations all endorsed the proposed act. See 1924 HAND-
BOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 450-
53; 1927 HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 658-62. Similarly, academic evaluations generally sup-
ported the passage of the act. See Edgar N. Durfee & Delmar W. Doddridge, Redemption
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principal features the declaration of a mortgage as a lien (with possession
remaining in the mortgagor until foreclosure), a regulated foreclosure by
power of sale (in addition to the possibility of judicial foreclosure), and a
post-foreclosure redemption period (with the length of time to be deter-
mined by each state). 3 Notwithstanding its adoption in 1927, the initial
defeat of the uniform act presaged its ultimate failure.
Because the states differed so significantly in their approaches to the
numerous areas of conflict between debtors' and creditors' mortgage
rights, the compromise reflected by the uniform law necessarily con-
tained "a form of foreclosure unfamiliar to practitioners in many juris-
dictions."" Whether because of a general political resistance to the
adoption of uniform laws65 or because the uniform act would require
significant changes in the laws of virtually every state,66 it achieved less
success than virtually any other uniform law recommended for adoption.
Over the ensuing seventeen years only one state adopted the uniform act,
and in 1943 the Commissioners declared the uniform act "obsolete."
'67
In 1940 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws took a different approach, recommending a Model Act in-
stead of a uniform law for consideration by the states.6 More modest in
approach, the Model Power of Sale Mortgage Foreclosure Act provided
for a power of sale foreclosure after three months notice to the mortgagor
and specified a nine-month statutory right of redemption; it also prohib-
ited deficiency actions. 9 Suffering the same fate as its predecessor, the
from Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 MICH. L. Rnv. 825, 838-41, 860-66
(1925); F.D.G. Ribble, The Uniform Mortgage Act, 12 VA. L. REV. 674, 674 (1926).
63. The chief changes from the 1925 proposal, which failed, to the 1927 proposal, which
passed, included leaving the statutory period of redemption to be determined by each individ-
ual state, clarifying that judicial foreclosures need not be affected by passage of the uniform
act, and allowing each state to determine the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to be
awarded. The complete text of the Act, as approved and recommended to the states, is set
forth in 1927 HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 672-718.
64. Note, Another Step Toward Progressive Legislation: The Uniform Mortgage Act, 38
HARV. L. REV. 651, 658 (1926).
65. In his last annual address as President of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Law, Nathan MacChesney spoke at great length on the political debates
concerning states' autonomy and federalism. See 1925 HANDBOOK, supra note 59, at 349-76.
66. The basic structure of the uniform act was evidently taken from the then-existing
Minnesota statute, which itself derived from the 1828 statutes of New York. Durfee & Dod-
dridge, supra note 62, at 835 n.35.
67. 1943 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 66. The one state reported to have adopted the uniform act was Minne-
sota, whose statute had been the model for the uniform act in the first place. See supra note 66.
68. 1940 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 175 [hereinafter 1940 HANDBOOK].
69. Id. at 254, 257.
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Model Act was not enacted by any jurisdiction.
Beginning in 1975 the National Conference started producing a
large number of uniform laws addressing real estate issues in general and
real estate finance questions in particular. The Uniform Land Transac-
tions Act ("ULTA"),7 ° approved in 1975, and the Uniform Simplifica-
tion of Land Transfers Act ("USLTA"),7' approved in 1976, address
issues central to real estate transfers and real estate finance. The Uni-
form Land Security Interest Act ("ULSIA"),72 approved in 1985, deals
solely with real estate finance transactions and follows closely the corre-
sponding provisions of the ULTA. ULSIA permits a secured creditor to
take possession upon default if the security agreement so provides, 73 per-
mits power of sale foreclosure if authorized by the security agreement,74
requires five weeks notice of a sale to the debtor and all other interested
parties,75 prohibits deficiency actions following power of sale foreclosure
of residential owner occupied property, 76 and contains no post-foreclo-
sure sale right of redemption. 7 ULSIA, for the first time, recognizes a
separate category of "protected persons" such as residential debtors who
are entitled to additional protections. 78 As of 1991, no state had enacted
ULTA, USLTA, or ULSIA.79
In yet another attempt to provide a degree of coherence to the diver-
sity of real estate finance laws across the country, the American Law
Institute began preparing, in 1990, a Restatement of the Law dealing
70. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 469 (1975) (amended 1977 and 1983).
71. UNIF. SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFERS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 249 (1976) (amended
1990).
72. UN F. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT, 7A U.L.A. 184 (Supp. 1992).
73. UNiF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT § 503(a), 7A U.L.A. 217 (1986 & Supp.
1992).
74. Id. § 507(c), 7A U.L.A. 223; see James M. Pedowitz, Mortgage Foreclosure under
ULSIA, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 495, 499-501, 504-05 (1992).
75. UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT § 508, 7A U.L.A. 224 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
Significant to many jurisdictions, this provision rejects the adequacy of notice by publication.
76. Id. § 511(b), 7A U.L.A. 228. See John Mixon & Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relief
for Foreclosed Homeowners: ULSIA Section 511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 455, 457
(1992).
77. UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT § 513 cmt. 1, 7A U.L.A. 230 (1986 & Supp.
1992).
78. Id. § 113, 7A U.L.A. 199-200. When a protected party is the debtor, the notice of
default and intent to foreclose cannot be given until a default has existed for five weeks, id.
§ 507(b), and the foreclosure sale cannot be conducted until five weeks after the notice is sent.
Id. § 509(a). Thus, the Act functionally grants the debtor a minimum period of 10 weeks
following initial default.
79. 1991-1992 REFERENCE BOOK, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 115, 120 (1991).
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with mortgages." Based on the proposition that while the "lack of uni-
formity may have been only a minor inconvenience in an earlier era[,]
today it is a serious obstacle to the nation's economic welfare,"81 the
Institute seeks to provide a basis for uniform legal rules. 2
While much of the impetus for uniform laws during the twentieth
century has come from conventional institutional lenders, title insurance
companies, and bar associations, the emergence during the late 1970s of
the secondary mortgage market also created a significant demand for
standardization in real estate finance. For a number of years the govern-
mental purchasers of home mortgages, particularly the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (FHLMC), developed and required standard form promis-
sory notes and security instruments.83 Such instruments contain a large
number of uniform covenants, but, because of the differences in state
laws, they are also tailored to each jurisdiction by nonuniform covenants.
Notwithstanding this lack of uniformity, the secondary mortgage market
and mortgage securitization grew rapidly during the 1980s. By the end
of 1978, approximately ten percent of all mortgages on one to four family
non-farm properties were held in mortgage pools or trusts; by the end of
1989, the percentage had nearly quadrupled.84
The diversity among the states in the allocation of rights and duties
between debtors and creditors in real estate finance thus reflects several
basic propositions. First, state laws are a complex balance between rec-
ognition of creditors' rights and protection of debtors' interests. Second,
each state differs in its current approach, with questions of foreclosure
procedures, rights of redemption, and deficiency restrictions being set in
a web of contractual and statutory relationships. Third, attempts to
achieve voluntarily interstate uniformity have been unsuccessful.
III. GROWTH OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT
The role of the United States government in real estate finance arose
80. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1991; Tentative Draft No. 2, 1992).
81. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) at 1 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1991).
82. "A major goal of this Restatement, then, is to assist in unifying the law of real prop-
erty security by identifying and articulating legal rules that will meet the legitimate needs of
the lending industry while at the same time providing reasonable protections for borrowers,"
Id. at 2.
83. CHARLES L. EDSON & BARRY G. JACOBS, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET GUIDE
app. C (1991).
84. SAVINGS & HOME FINANCING SOURCE BOOK tbl. C-1 (1989) (Mortgage Debt Out-
standing on 1-4 Family Nonfarm Homes by Type of Holder).
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only in the twentieth century. That role, however, has been immense.
There is virtually no area of real estate finance law today that is immune
from federal law. The participation of and intervention by the federal
government has occurred in two forms, or phases. The first phase, from
1933 to 1968, involved primarily the creation of national housing policies
and targeted federal housing programs. The second phase, from roughly
1968 to the present, reflects direct transaction regulation and specific
substantive intervention. This phase included the wave of deregulation
and the banking collapse, which have left the federal government as the
owner of mortgages of every type in every jurisdiction. During both
phases, but particularly during the last two decades, there has been a
dramatic increase in indirect regulation of real estate finance by other
federal laws, notably bankruptcy and environmental laws.
Over the course of the twentieth century the federal government has
functioned in a large variety of markedly different roles. It has served as
a market regulator in establishing disclosure requirements and by limit-
ing substantive terms of real estate transactions in areas such as the en-
forceability of due-on-sale clauses and usury. It has functionally served
as a direct market participant by originating and holding mortgages, and
as an indirect market participant by insuring and guaranteeing loans. It
has served as a market catalyst and stimulator in purchasing loans in the
secondary mortgage market. As banking regulator and insurer, the fed-
eral government has become the largest single holder of mortgages in the
country.
The fact that the federal government plays so many roles increases
substantially the difficulties posed by the lack of uniformity in real estate
finance among jurisdictions. While Congress has, in many statutes, ex-
pressly established uniform requirements, or at least a minimum set of
requirements, the overlay of federal and state laws has created substan-
tial confusion over what law governs a particular transaction.
A. Early Involvement
Although there were a few scattered earlier efforts,85 active federal
involvement in real estate finance began with the New Deal. The Federal
Home Loan Bank Act of 193286 established a source of credit reserves to
enable lending institutions to make long-term home mortgages; the
85. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 65-149, ch. 74, 40 Stat. 550 (1918) (authorizing the development
of housing programs to meet the housing needs in the District of Columbia prompted by
World War I).
86. Pub. L. No. 72-304, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1421 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
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Home Owners' Loan Act of 193387 created the initial Home Owners'
Loan Corporation and federal savings and loan associations to finance
and refinance single family residences; and the National Housing Act of
193488 created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and initiated the first fed-
eral mortgage insurance program. The primary thrust of these early
congressional efforts was to provide a stable and long-term source of
funds for residential mortgages, primarily through increasing liquidity
for lending institutions and providing mortgage insurance. The Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, created in 1935,89 served as an initial li-
quidity provider by purchasing FHA-insured mortgages, and in so doing
set the precedent for the secondary mortgage market phenomenon.
From this precedent emerged the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion (FNMA).90 Following World War II Congress granted FNMA a
separate congressional charter, 91 authorizing it to serve as the sole secon-
dary mortgage market entity, and vested it with authority to purchase
not only FHA-insured mortgages but also the rapidly expanding supply
of guaranteed loans to veterans. 92 The expansion of these programs coin-
cided with the congressional declaration that:
[T]he general welfare and security of the Nation and the health
and living standards of its people require housing production
and related community development sufficient to remedy the
serious housing shortage. . . . and the realization as soon as
feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living envi-
ronment for every American family.93
With the exception of a relatively small number of direct loan pro-
grams,9 4 the role of the federal government throughout this period was
87. Pub. L. No. 73-43, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (1988 & Supp. 111990)). The Home Owners' Loan Corporation was dissolved by Act
of June 30, 1953, ch. 170, 67 Stat. 121, 126-27 (1953).
88. Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C., primarily 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1742 (1988 & Supp. I 1990)).
89. Pub. L. No. 74-1, ch. 2, 49 Stat. 1 (1935).
90. A brief historical summary of the Federal National Mortgage Association and the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation is set forth in 43 Fed. Reg. 36,200, 36,200-02 (1978).
91. Pub. L. No. 80-864, 62 Stat. 1206 (1948).
92. The residential mortgage loan guarantee program for veterans commenced in 1944.
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284 (1944). The
veterans' guaranteed loan program is presently codified at 38 U.S.C. ch. 37, §§ 1802-1851
(1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
93. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)). Congress reaffirmed this national goal in 1968. Pub. L.
No 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1988)).




to serve as a facilitator of the real estate finance market, particularly with
respect to residential mortgages. The only major controversy arising
from the federal government's involvement was that the success of
FNMA prompted protests by private secondary mortgage market enti-
ties. As a result, in 1954 Congress amended the charter of FNMA to
impose certain restrictions on its mortgage purchases.95
Because this federal involvement was indirect, there was little ques-
tion whether the existence of the federal programs constituted a basis for
overriding state real estate finance laws in favor of a federal common law
of real estate finance. The federal insurance and guarantee programs
seemed by their silence to assume the application of state laws. A leading
commentator on federal housing programs during this period pointed
out, "It is a fact of vital importance in the shaping of a national housing
policy that in the control of credit institutions dealing with housing, as in
land control, the role of the states is constitutionally dominant."96
B. Direct Regulation
After 1968, the role of the federal government in real estate finance
changed dramatically. Congress increased its role as a market regulator
of real estate finance transactions, initially by mandating disclosure re-
quirements for virtually all residential mortgage loan transactions. Later
Congress began to set substantive limitations on the authority of states to
legislate on specific issues. Additionally, Congress expanded considera-
bly its role as a market participant by increasing the number of federally
related secondary mortgage market entities. These heightened roles
raised more acutely the question whether federal or state law governed
the transaction.
Congressionally enacted mandatory disclosure laws took the form of
the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (TILA),97 the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA),9 8 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act of 1975 (HMDA) 99 In all three instances Congress concluded that
existing market mechanisms did not provide comprehensible information
95. Housing Act of 1954, § 304(d), Pub. L. No. 83-560, 68 Stat. 590, 616 (1954).
96. CHARLES M. HAAR, FEDERAL CREDIT AND PRIVATE HOUSING 7 (1960). Professor
Haar recognized that "[w]ithout regard to the wisdom of any particular provision, diversity of
state law is in and of itself an impediment to mortgage investment," and that "the enactment
of uniform mortgage laws, uniform mechanics lien laws, standard real estate mortgage tax
laws, and uniform standards of title requirements by all of the states could do much to assure
the successful operation of Federal legislation in aid of private housing finance." Id. at 342-43.
97. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601
(1988)).
98. Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988)).
99. Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (1988)).
1993]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to the consumer and that clearer, less complex information could result
in greater competition and prevent unfair practices."° TILA required
uniform disclosure of financing charges and annual percentage rates to
borrowers; 1 ' RESPA required advance disclosure of the charges, terms,
and condition of a loan, and a uniform settlement statement for closing
costs;"0 2 HMDA required that lending institutions compile and disclose
detailed statistical information on their mortgage loans by location of the
secured property.10 3 While these Acts have achieved a certain degree of
uniformity and disclosure, some commentators have seriously questioned
whether the required disclosures have achieved the original congressional
purposes.) 4
The congressional introduction of the concept of a "federally related
mortgage loan"'1 5 reveals the intended reach of these federal disclosure
laws, as well as the increased role of the federal government in mortgage
lending. Because such loans include any residential first mortgage loan
made by a federally insured lender, any loan insured by a federal agency,
and any loan which is intended to be sold to a federally related secondary
mortgage market entity, the disclosure laws are applicable to the over-
whelming majority of all residential first mortgage loans in the country.
Such a sweeping definition has, in turn, become the basis for other con-
gressional declarations on real estate finance.10 6
100. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (1988); id. § 2801(b); 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1988).
101. The comprehensive regulations of the Truth in Lending Act are set forth in what is
known as "Regulation Z." 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (1992).
102. The regulations pertaining to real estate loans are set forth in what is known as "Reg-
ulation X." 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500 (1989). For a discussion of the background and interpretation
of RESPA, see Dale A. Whitman, The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act: How to Com-
ply--Problems and Prospects, 4 REAL EsT. L.J. 223, 223-43 (1976).
103. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). In 1977, Congress imposed limited af-
firmative duties on financial institutions by requiring residential mortgage lenders to develop
plans to meet the credit needs of the entire community in which the institution is located.
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 2901-2902 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
104. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mort-
gage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and
Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1128-35 (1984); Diana Stoppello, Federal Regulation
of Home Mortgage Settlement Costs: RESPA and its Alternatives, 63 MINN. L. REV. 367, 445-
56 (1979).
105. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1) (1988). This sweeping definition of a federally related
mortgage loan appears to have been first used in the antidiscrimination provisions of the Hous-
ing and Community Development Act of 1974, Title VIII, § 808(a), Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88
Stat. 633, 728-29 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5(b) (1988)).
106. See, e.g., Depositor Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Ti-
tle V, § 501, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, 161-62 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (1988 &
Supp. II 1990)) (congressional preemption of state usury limits with respect to residential
mortgage loans). The broad sweep of the "federally related mortgage loan" has been noted
with some dismay. See MeInnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 271 Ark. 503, 507, 611 S.W.2d
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In enacting these disclosure laws Congress made it abundantly clear
that the requirements of federal law preempt corresponding state laws
only to the extent of an inconsistency between federal law and state
law. 0 7 States expressly retain the authority to enact requirements which
provide greater protections to the consumer or require more extensive
disclosures.10 8
The second form of market regulation which developed during this
period was the determination by Congress that certain state laws inter-
fered with the optimum functioning of the real estate finance market.
The two most visible examples of this were the express preemption, in
1980, of state usury laws relating to real estate finance,109 and, in 1982, of
state laws regulating due-on-sale clauses in mortgages. 1 10 The usury pre-
emption expressly permitted an affirmative state override if undertaken
within three years, and sixteen jurisdictions chose to reinstate their own
usury statutes.1 1  Express congressional preemption of the laws concern-
ing due-on-sale clauses followed by only a few months the Supreme
Court's decision in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la
Cuesta, "2 in which the Court held that regulations issued by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) preempted conflicting state laws re-
stricting the use of due-on-sale clauses. The FHLBB regulations permit-
ted savings and loan associations to enforce due-on-sale clauses in
accordance with their terms even though several states had limited the
exercise of such clauses. Because there was no express statutory preemp-
tion, the Supreme Court held that regulations within the scope of statu-
tory authority could preempt conflicting state laws where the agency
intended such preemption.1 13 The subsequent congressional legislation
made express what had been implied and extended the preemption to
767, 773 (1981) (Hickmon, J., dissenting) ("[The lender] claims it has 'federally-related' busi-
ness under the federal law simply because it keeps a lien on the land it sells. Most lenders keep
a lien on land that is sold. If such an act is 'federally-related' then brushing your teeth is
federally related.").
107. 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (1988); id. § 2805(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (1988).
108. 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (1988); id. § 2805(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (1988).
109. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Title V,
§ 501, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 161 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (1988)); 12 C.F.R. pt.
590 (1992).
110. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Title III, § 341, Pub. L. No.
97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1505-07 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1988 & Supp. 111990)).
111. Twelve of these jurisdictions, however, expressly permit any rate of interest to be
adopted so long as it is disclosed in the underlying documentation. EDSON & JACOBS, supra
note 83, at 10-15 & n.70; Eskridge, supra note 104, at 1109 n.92. In the opinion of the Office of
Thrift Supervision, such preemption extends not only to civil usury statutes but to criminal
usury statutes as well. 12 C.F.R. § 590.101(b) (1992).
112. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
113. Id. at 153, 159, 167.
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virtually all residential mortgage loans.114
Two additional examples of express substantive intervention by
Congress involve adjustable rate mortgages and the transfer of mortgage
servicing rights. In the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of
1982,115 Congress expressly preempted all state laws pertaining to alter-
native mortgage instruments' 16 insofar as such laws were more restrictive
than parallel regulations issued by the Comptroller of the Currency for
federally regulated financial institutions." 7 As in the case of usury pre-
emption, states were permitted to "override" this preemption by addi-
tional state legislation before October 15, 1985.11 Although less
dramatic substantively, Congress in 1990 enacted uniform disclosure and
notice requirements for the transfer or sale of mortgage loan servicing.19
Designed to provide protection to mortgage debtors and to facilitate the
sale of servicing rights, this legislation expressly preempts inconsistent
state law requirements.1
20
One of the first congressional attempts to establish a uniform mort-
gage foreclosure law was the proposed Federal Mortgage Foreclosure
Act, first introduced in Congress in 1973.121 The proposed bill, which
was never enacted, provided for a nonjudicial power of sale foreclosure
by a "foreclosure commissioner" as early as sixty days after the initial
default.122 The bill contained no requirement that sales be made for fair
market value, no limitations on deficiency actions, and no statutory right
114. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Congressional Preemption of Mortgage Due-
on-Sale Law: An Analysis of the Garn-St. Germain Act, 35 HASTINGS. L.J. 241, 273-98 (1983).
The congressional preemption expressly preserved state law restrictions on the exercise of due-
on-sale clauses with respect to a narrow "window period" and permitted states to extend the
window period in certain circumstances. 12 U.S.C. § 1701-j(3)(c) (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 591
(1992); see EDSON & JACOBS, supra note 83, at 10-20 & n.87.
115. Pub. L. No. 97-320, tit. VIII, 96 Stat. 1545, 1545 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (1988
& Supp. 11 1990)).
116. Alternative mortgage instruments include primarily adjustable rate mortgages, gradu-
ated payment mortgages, and reverse annuity mortgages. 12 U.S.C. § 3802(1) (1988); see
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 26, § 11.4, at 776-800.
117. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34.1 (1992).
118. 12 U.S.C. § 3804(a) (1988). Several jurisdictions chose to exercise this override au-
thority. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 1-110 (West Supp. 1991); N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 6-g (McKinney 1990).
119. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, § 941, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104
Stat. 4405, 4405 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (Supp. 11 1990)).
120. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(h) (Supp. 11 1990).
121. Title IV of the National Housing Act of 1973, S. 2507, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in Hearings on S. 2490, S. 2507, & S. 2508 Before Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 394, 483 (1973).
122. Sections 405, 412, Title IV of the National Housing Act of 1973, S. 2507, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in Hearings on S. 2490, S. 2507, & S. 2508 Before Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 394, 487, 498 (1973). The foreclosure
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of redemption. Applicable to any mortgage made, owned, insured, or
guaranteed by the federal government, the primary objective of this pro-
posal was to reduce costs to the government as a secured creditor rather
than to achieve any uniform protections for debtors.
123
Congress passed virtually identical provisions eight years later in the
Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 198 1.124 Applicable only to
multifamily mortgages held by the Secretary of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, this Act authorizes a nonjudicial power of sale foreclosure as
early as thirty days following default, provided twenty-one days advance
notice of the sale is given to all interested parties. This Act does not
require that sales be for the fair market value of the property; sealed bids
rather than competitive open bids are submitted at the sale. 125 There is
no statutory right of redemption, and deficiency actions are permitted to
the extent authorized by the security documents and state law. 126
Although it applies only to a minority of all multifamily mortgages
outstanding in the United States, and an extremely small percentage of
the total outstanding mortgage debt in the United States,127 this Act
stands as the first, and clearest, example of congressionally mandated
uniformity in real estate foreclosure laws. In expressly preempting state
laws in a majority of jurisdictions, this Act is striking in two respects.
1 28
First, its objectives of achieving foreclosures more expeditiously and low-
ering overall costs to the creditor are simple and clear. Second, its si-
lence with respect to the diversity among the states in this area of law,
commissioner, although disinterested in form, would in substance be designated by the security
agreement-presumably prepared by the secured creditor.
123. As proposed the bill included congressional findings "(1) that disparate State laws
relating to the foreclosure of real estate mortgages and deeds of trust . . . have burdened
Federal programs involving real estate mortgages made, owned, insured or guaranteed by the
United States,... (5) that the availability of a uniform, less expensive, and more expeditious
foreclosure procedure is required to ... facilitate the sale and resale in nationwide secondary
mortgages markets of secured real estate loans ... , (6) that enactment of legislation providing
for a less expensive and more expeditious nonjudicial foreclosure procedure will reduce unnec-
essary litigation .... " Section 402, Title IV of the National Housing Act of 1973, S. 2507, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Hearings on S. 2490, . 2507, & S. 2508 Before Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 394, 484-85 (1973). The weaknesses
of the bill were noted in Washburn, supra note 50, at 935-36.
124. Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. III, 95 Stat. 422, 422 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3701 (1985)).
125. 12 U.S.C. § 3710(b) (1988).
126. Id. § 3713(d).
127. As of the end of 1990, FmHA, FHA, VA, FNMA, and FHLMC directly held approx-
imately $28 billion in multifamily mortgages, with an additional $28 billion held in mortgage
pools by GNMA, FHLMC, and FNMA. This amount represents approximately 18% of all
multifamily mortgages, but only 1% of the aggregate mortgage debt outstanding in the United
States. 78 FED. RESERVE BULL., Jan. 1992, at A36, Thl. 1.54.
128. S. REP. No. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 263 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N
559, 559-64.
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and their constant struggle with the fair allocation of rights among debt-
ors and creditors, is deafening.
C. Indirect Regulation
Three separate areas of law, in recent years, have profoundly af-
fected state real estate finance laws: bankruptcy, environmental liability,
and drug forfeiture. In each of these areas Congress has altered the
traditional allocations within each state of the rights and duties of the
secured creditor and debtor.
Federal bankruptcy laws have had the most significant impact on
real estate finance. While federal law makes the filing of a bankruptcy
petition an automatic stay of all other proceedings, including foreclo-
sures,129 and grants a bankruptcy trustee the power to avoid the secured
transaction entirely,130 to cure a default and "deaccelerate" the indebted-
ness, 131 and to avoid preferential transfers,132 the most controversial pro-
visions have pertained to the authority to set aside fraudulent
conveyances and to modify terms of outstanding loans. Applying the
fraudulent transfer provision 133 to foreclosure sales, courts have con-
cluded that sales for substantially less than fair market value can consti-
tute a fraudulent transfer. In a threshold case the Fifth Circuit
suggested, in dicta, that a sale for less than seventy percent of fair market
value would constitute "less than reasonably equivalent value. 1 34 The
Eleventh Circuit later modified this bright line rule to reject any percent-
age test as the basis for a presumption.13 1 Other jurisdictions have sug-
gested that the substantive issue is whether setting aside the transfer
129. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). An exception is granted, however, for multifamily HUD-
insured mortgages. Id. § 362(b)(8).
130. Id. § 558.
131. Id. § 1322(b)(3).
132. Id. § 547(c). Whether a nonjudicial power of sale foreclosure can be set aside as a
voidable preference (as opposed to a fraudulent transfer) is unclear. Several courts have held
that such sales can be set aside on this basis. See Park N. Partners v. Park N. Assocs. (In re
Park North Partners), 80 B.R. 551, 555 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987); FNMA v. Wheeler (In re
Wheeler), 34 B.R. 818, 820-21 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Morris Plan Co. v. Fountain (In re
Fountain), 32 B.R. 965, 957-68 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983). Other courts have concluded that
preferential avoidance is not applicable to foreclosure sales. See Ehring v. Western Commu-
nity Moneycenter (In re Ehring), 900 F.2d 184, 189 (9th Cir. 1990); First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n of Warner Robbins v. Standard Bldg. Assocs., 87 B.R. 221, 224 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988);
Park N. Partners, Ltd. v. Park N. Assocs., 85 B.R. 916, 919 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
133. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988).
134. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980). Thus, sales
at 64% and 68% of fair market value have been avoided. Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance
Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983, 988-89 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989); Warner Robbins, 87 BR. at
222-23.
135. Grissom v. Johnson, 955 F.2d 1440, 1443 (1lth Cir. 1992).
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would result in any benefit to the debtor's estate, 136 or would solely bene-
fit other creditors. 137 Several circuits have rejected a mathematical ap-
proach, preferring to evaluate the issue on the particular facts of each
case. 138
Of equal concern to secured creditors is the possibility that a bank-
ruptcy court could determine that the creditor has a secured claim in
bankruptcy only to the extent of the fair market value of the security,
with the remainder of the claim not being an "allowed secured claim."
'139
The United States Supreme Court has recently ruled that such "lien-
stripping" is not permitted in the context of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy peti-
tion,1" but arguably left open the question whether this interpretation
would also be applied in the context of a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13
proceeding. 141
Environmental laws adopted by Congress over the last fifteen years
have also had a dramatic impact on real estate finance. Federal laws
have imposed liability upon owners and operators, and possibly secured
creditors. 142 Although there is an exception from strict liability for a
party "who, without participation in management, holds indicia of own-
ership primarily to protect his security interest,"14 3 secured creditors can
become liable for hazardous waste clean-up costs either through exten-
sive participation in management 44 or through purchasing the property
136. Walker v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 888 F.2d 90, 94 (11th Cir. 1989).
137. Brown v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Brown), 104 B.R. 609, 614-15 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1989).
138. E.g., Barret v. Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20, 23 (3d Cir.
1991); Bundles v. Baker, 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988).
139. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 506(d) (1988).
140. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
141. Id. at 778 n.3. Several lower courts have held that such modification is permitted.
Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1413 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland v. Lomas &
Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Union Mort-
gage Co. (In re Franklin), 126 B.R. 702, 707 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991).
142. E.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(1988)), amended by The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),
Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(35), 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
144. Compare United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir.
1990) (holding that capacity to influence hazardous waste decisions may be sufficient basis for
liability), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991) with Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. The East Asiatic Co.
(In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.), 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that mere capacity to
influence management decisions is insufficient basis for liability). See also United States v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22 (D.R.I. 1989) (holding that active involvement of a
creditor parent corporation is sufficient basis for liability), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991). See generally Note, Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet
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at a foreclosure sale. 145 The Environmental Protection Agency has is-
sued regulations designed to clarify safe harbor boundaries of a lender's
permissible involvement.146 In addition to identifying the parties poten-
tially liable for environmental contamination, the statute permits the fed-
eral government to obtain a lien on the property for all costs and
damages of actual and potential clean-up.'
47
The third area of recent federal legislation cutting across the diver-
sity in state real estate finance laws permits forfeiture of any real and
personal property used in illegal drug activities. 14  Because the effective
date of the forfeiture derives from the date of the illegal conduct rather
than the date of seizure, owners and creditors are placed in a precarious
position. 149  While the statute contains an "innocent owner defense"
against forfeiture,'50 there is a split of authority on whether lack of
knowledge and lack of consent are both necessary conditions of the de-
fense. 1 ' A lienholder is protected only to the extent of its interest in the
real property, 52 and it is not clear whether a lienholder is entitled to
interest which accrues during the post-seizure period." 3
Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARV. L, REV.
1249, 1250 (1991) (arguing that federal courts have misunderstood the purpose of the security
interest exemption and the scope of its application to lenders).
145. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989);
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986).
146. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,383-85 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 to
.1105).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(i) (1988).
148. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
149. Id. § 881(h) (1988).
150. Id. § 881(a)(7).
151. Some courts have held that a claimant must prove that it was without knowledge and
consent. United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990). Other courts have
held that either lack of knowledge or lack of consent is a sufficient condition. United States v.
890 Noyac Rd., 945 F.2d 1252, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886
F.2d 618, 620 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 686 (1974) (finding no Fifth Amendment violation in declaring forfeiture of property of
innocent owner).
152. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
153. Some courts have held that a creditor is not entitled to post-seizure interest. United
States v. 8.4 Acres of Land, 648 F. Supp. 79, 81-82 (D.S.C. 1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 549 (4th
Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Coastal Seafood Enters. v. United States, 823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. One Condominium Apt., 636 F. Supp. 457, 458 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United
States v. One Piece of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 724 (W.D. Tex. 1983). Others have held
that the real property is security for the accrued interest as well. In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819
F.2d 446, 448 (4th Cir. 1987); Monroe Say. Bank, FSB v. Catalano, 733 F. Supp. 595, 598-99
(W.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Real Property Titled in Name of Shashin, Ltd., 680 F.
Supp. 332, 336-37 (D. Haw. 1987).
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D. Market Participation
One of the most dramatic changes in real estate finance during the
twentieth century has been the emergence of the secondary mortgage
market and its explosive growth in recent years. With the precedent
firmly established by the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA), both governmental and private participation in the secondary
mortgage market has expanded substantially since 1968. In 1968, Con-
gress restructured FNMA as a private corporation and created a separate
governmental agency, the Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA), to assume purchasing loans of the targeted special assistance
programs of the federal government. 154 Two years later it created the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) primarily to as-
sist savings and loan associations through the purchase of VA, FHA, and
conventional loans.' 55 FNMA, FHLMC, and GNMA all serve as secon-
dary mortgage market purchasers of real estate loans. They also serve as
secondary market conduits by creating large pools of mortgages and sell-
ing to investors certificates giving them rights to the principal and inter-
est payments received by the pool. 156 By the end of 1990 approximately
thirty percent of the aggregate mortgage debt in the United States was
held in some form of mortgage-backed security.15 7
As skyrocketing interest rates coupled with a recessionary economy
during the late 1970s led to federal preemption of due-on-sale clauses,
usury limitations, and restrictions on alternative mortgage instruments,
the collapse of large segments of the savings and loan industry in the late
1980s placed the federal government in the center of the mortgage lend-
ing market. The enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)158 constituted the most
significant restructuring of federal banking regulatory agencies since the
1930s.159 Among other changes, it dissolved the existing insurance cor-
poration for savings and loan associations; placed insurance responsibil-
154. Title. VIII, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82
Stat. 536 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
155. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act of 1970 §§ 301-310, Pub. L. No. 91-
351, 84 Stat. 451, 454-55 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988 & Supp. 111990)).
156. KENNETH G. LORE, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: DEVELOPMENTS AND
TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET § 2.01 (1991); see NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 26, § 11.3, at 764-73.
157. 78 FED. RESERVE BULL., Jan. 1992, at A36, Tl. 1.54. Almost half of all mortgages
originated during 1989 were subsequently moved onto the secondary mortgage market; see
LORE, supra note 156, § 1.01, at 1-5.
158. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
and 15 U.S.C.).
159. Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7, S49 (1991).
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ity solely with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; shifted
regulatory responsibility to the Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS); and created a new agency, the Resolution Trust Cor-
poration (RTC), to manage and resolve insolvent thrift institutions.1 60
While the total cost of the thrift industry bailout encompassed by
FIRREA is unknown,1 61 it is clear that virtually overnight the RTC be-
came one of the largest holders of mortgages in the United States. In the
first two years of its existence, from August 1989 through August 1991,
the RTC took control of 646 thrift institutions (closing 511 of them),
having assets of $340.7 billion, of which $161.3 billion were represented
by mortgage loans.162 At the end of this period the RTC still retained
over $83 billion in mortgage loans.
1 63
This indirect participation in real estate finance, whether through
the federally related secondary mortgage market entities or through the
RTC as the successor of failed savings and loan associations, provides yet
additional bases for uncertainty about whether state or federal laws gov-
ern the real estate transactions. Efficiency in the operations of the secon-
dary mortgage market requires a high degree of national uniformity.
164
Efficiency concerns could easily justify express congressional preemption,
but thus far secondary mortgage market legislation has not preempted
state real estate finance laws expressly; judicial decisions have tended to
treat the federal entities as private actors for most purposes.16 Nonethe-
less, Congress has bestowed upon the RTC the protection of federal com-
mon law and express statutory exemptions from the application of state
laws. 16 6 Although the size of the RTC mortgage holdings comprises
only a small percentage of the total mortgages held by the federal govern-
ment, I 67 the impact of such holdings on the state real estate finance laws
160. JAMES R. BARTH & PHILIP R. WIEST, CONSOLIDATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF
THE U.S. THRIFT INDUSTRY UNDER THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REFORM, RECOVERY
AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 2-3 (Office of Thrift Supervision Research Paper #89-01, 1989).
161. It has been estimated to be as high as $180 billion. WILLIAM JACKSON & BARBARA
L. MILES, HOUSING FINANCE RESTRUCTURING: CHANGES AND NEW ISSUES CREATED BY
FIRREA (P.L. 101-73), CRS-8, Major Studies and Issues Briefs of the Congressional Re-
search Service: 1991 Supp., No. 91-296E (University Publications of America, Feb. 22, 1991).
162. RTC REV., Aug. 1991, at 1, 15-16.
163. Id. at 16. As of August 31, 1991 the RTC retained $33.1 billion in performing 1-4
family mortgage loans, and $3.6 billion in delinquent 1-4 family mortgage loans. Id. at 2.
164. The drafters of the ULTA had argued that "[o]ne of the major purposes of this Act is
to provide uniformity in state law which will facilitate the creation of a legal atmosphere which
encourages development of a widespread secondary mortgage market." UNIF. LAND TRANS-
ACTIONS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 470 (1977).
165. See infra notes 456-58 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 443-46 and accompanying text.
167. As of the end of 1990 the federal government and related agencies (GNMA, FmHA,
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is disproportionate to its size. The RTC's entitlement to the protection
of judicially created federal common-law rules and express statutory pro-
tections compounds uncertainty, because the laws governing a real estate
transaction change when the creditor changes from a private commercial
institution to a federal agency.
In the dramatic growth in the form and substance of federal inter-
vention in real estate finance during the twentieth century, several dis-
tinct forces have emerged. First, Congress's role as a market regulator
has expanded considerably, both in terms of mandatory disclosure laws
and in express displacement of state regulations of particular substantive
issues. Second, the federal government's involvement as a market par-
ticipant, primarily in insuring or guaranteeing loans, has increased the
frequency of conflicts between such loan programs and state real estate
laws.
IV. THE CHAOS OF PREEMPTION AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The phenomenal growth of involvement of the federal government
in real estate finance over the past sixty years has taken many forms.
This multitude of forms evidences the increasingly national scope of real
estate finance and the need for constant attention to the pivotal role of
federal law in an area historically dominated by state law. When Con-
gress, through express preemption, has displaced state laws directly by
establishing minimum finance disclosure requirements, or indirectly by
imposing additional requirements through bankruptcy or environmental
laws, it has made more complex the practice of real estate finance. Ex-
press preemption, however, has not necessarily made the practice less
predictable.
The greatest blow to predictability occurs when there is significant
federal government involvement without an accompanying express deter-
mination by Congress of the applicable law. Implied preemption and
federal common law have been inadequate foundations for the judicial
resolution of conflicts between state real estate finance laws and the oper-
ation of federal mortgage programs. In key areas of real estate finance,
where the states have developed complex allocations of rights and duties
among debtors and creditors, judicial determinations of controlling law
have proven neither consistent nor predictable. 6 '
FHA, VA, FNMA, FHLMC, and Federal Land Banks) held over $250 billion in mortgages,
with an additional $1,106 billion held primarily in federally related mortgage pools and trusts.
78 FED. RESERVE BULL., Jan. 1992, at A36, Tbl. 1.54.
168. To the extent that one moves from the more central issues of real estate finance to
peripheral matters, there is a greater likelihood that state laws will govern the dispute, but
there is still a lack of consensus in the preemption analysis. For example, the courts are split
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A. State Antideficiency Laws
In United States v. Shimer,'6 9 the United States Supreme Court, in
1961, confronted the issue of whether the Veterans Administration (VA),
having failed to obtain a confirmation of the foreclosure sale as required
by state law, could nonetheless proceed in an action for a deficiency
against the original debtor. 7 ° The Court held that regulations issued by
the Veterans Administration governing its guaranteed loan program
were "meant to displace state law."' 71 One might innocently have
thought that this decision would have clarified this issue, and that as a
general proposition federal mortgage loan program regulations would
preempt state antideficiency laws. In the thirty-odd years since Shimer,
however, this simply has not been the case."7 z
Of the twenty cases decided since Shimer which most clearly have
addressed possible preemption of state antideficiency laws by federal
on whether local landlord-tenant laws are preempted. Compare Ayers v. Philadelphia Hous.
Auth., 908 F.2d 1184, 1189-93 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that HUD regulations preempt state
eviction laws), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1003 (1991) with Rowe v. Pierce, 622 F. Supp. 1030,
1031-33 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that HUD regulations do not preempt local law concerning
evictions). The same lack of consensus exists with respect to housing code requirements.
Compare Burroughs v. Hills, 564 F. Supp. 1007, 1018-19 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that HUD-
owned properties are subject to local housing codes), aff'd, 741 F.2d 1525 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985) and City of Phila. v. Page, 363 F. Supp. 148, 152-55 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (holding that HUD is subject to local codes on lead-based paint) with Conille v. Secre-
tary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 840 F.2d 105, 109-14 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that federal com-
mon law, not state law, applies to HUD leasehold obligations). Requirements pertaining to
tax and insurance escrows are more complex. Compare Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Or. 533, 548-49, 577 P.2d 477, 487-88 (holding that S&L can be
subject to state laws on income from escrows when FHLBB has not issued regulations), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978) with First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417,
425-26 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding state law on interest governing escrow accounts preempted by
FHLBB regulations) and Goudreau v. Standard Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 511 A.2d 386, 390-
92 (D.C. 1986) (holding that local law prohibiting mandatory escrow accounts in certain cir-
cumstances was preempted by FHLBB regulation) and Olsen v. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 115 Ill. App. 3d 364, 367-70, 434 N.E.2d 406, 409-11 (1982) (holding that state law
governing interest on escrow accounts was preempted by FHLBB regulations). Preemption is
found when rent control limits conflict with the federal program. City of Boston v. Harris, 619
F.2d 87, 89 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that HUD regulations on permissible rent levels preempt
local rent control laws).
169. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
170. Id. at 375-77.
171. Id. at 381.
172. The result in Shimer is consistent with three earlier lower court opinions, although the
holdings of each of the earlier opinions appear to have been based on the existence of a sepa-
rate indemnity agreement between the VA and the debtor. McKnight v. United States, 259
F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Jones, 155 F. Supp. 52, 56 (M.D. Ga. 1957);
United States v. Henderson, 121 F. Supp. 343, 344 (S.D. Iowa 1953). The result in Shimer is
expressly based upon the alternative rationales of implied preemption and the separate indem-
nity agreement. See Shimer, 367 U.S. at 381-85, 387.
1993] REAL ESTATE FINANCE
mortgage programs, twelve have held in favor of preemption and permit-
ted the deficiency action. 173 In eight, the courts have concluded that
state law controls and have denied the deficiency actions. 174 These dispa-
rate results can be explained (although not necessarily justified) by sev-
eral discrete factors. Some of the courts rejecting preemption did so in
cases involving loans made by the Small Business Administration (SBA),
not the Veterans Administration; these courts found that because SBA
loans lacked national uniformity in character, preemption was unneces-
sary. 175 One decision, however, found that once the SBA has issued
comprehensive regulations, preemption is appropriate. 176 Cases involv-
ing only the Veterans Administration have produced similarly mixed re-
sults. Seven cases permitted the deficiency action 177 and four cases
rejected it.178 Two additional cases rejected a VA deficiency action on
separate grounds.1
7 9
The availability of alternative remedies under state law for secured
creditors, such as the option of a judicial foreclosure and a possible defi-
ciency action or a nonjudicial foreclosure without a deficiency action, is
173. United States v. Davis, 961 F.2d 603, 610-11 (7th Cir. 1992); Connelly v. Derwinski,
961 F.2d 129, 130 (9th Cir. 1992); Vail v. Derwinski, 946 F.2d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); United
States v. Haddon Haciendas Co., 541 F.2d 777, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. All-
geyer, 466 F.2d 1195, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Merrick Sponsor Corp., 421
F.2d 1076, 1078-79 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596, 597-98 (5th Cir.
1968); Herlong-Sierra Homes, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 300, 300 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 919 (1966); United States v. Rossi, 342 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1965); Jones v.
Turnage, 699 F. Supp. 795, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Derwinski, 914 F.2d
1496 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1309 (1991); Branden v. Driver, 293 F. Supp. 871,
873 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 441 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1971).
174. Whitehead v. Derwinski, 904 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1990); Great Southwest Life
Ins. Co. v. Frazier, 860 F.2d 896, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Irby, 618 F.2d 352,
355 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dismuke, 616 F.2d 755, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Stewart, 523 F.2d 1070, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. MacKenzie, 510
F.2d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Carter v. Derwinski, 758 F. Supp. 603, 605-06 (D. Idaho
1991), rehg granted, 970 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Vallejo, 660 F. Supp. 535,
537-39 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
175. Great Southwest Life Ins., 860 F.2d at 900; MacKenzie, 510 F.2d at 42.
176. Gish, 559 F.2d at 574-75.
177. Davis, 961 F.2d at 610-11; Connelly, 961 F.2d at 130; Vail, 946 F.2d at 592; Wells, 403
F.2d at 597-98; Rossi, 342 F.2d at 506; Jones, 699 F. Supp. at 800; Branden, 293 F. Supp. at
873.
178. Whitehead, 904 F.2d at 1369; Stewart, 523 F.2d at 1071-72; Carter, 758 F. Supp. at
605-06; Vallejo, 660 F. Supp. at 537-39.
179. United States v. Church, 736 F. Supp. 1494, 1498 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that since
lender released debtor without VA's permission, payment on guaranty by VA was gratuitous);
United States v. Murdock, 627 F. Supp. 272, 277-79 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (denying government's
summary judgment motion because issue of fact remained as to sufficiency of notice to
defendant).
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also a critical factor in explaining the inconsistent results reached by
courts. Several decisions have held that in electing to proceed with a
nonjudicial foreclosure, the federal agency waived its right to a defi-
ciency.180 Where state law does not provide the possibility of a deficiency
action under any circumstance, state law has been preempted."' 1
Although this rationale at least draws on state law, it begs the question
whether there is a need for a nationally uniform policy permitting both
nonjudicial foreclosure and a deficiency action-the result sought by the
VA regulations.1
82
One potentially significant differentiating factor among these cases is
that ten of the twenty post-Shimer cases dealing with antideficiency laws
were also decided after the United States Supreme Court's 1979 decision
in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.18 3 While Kimbell Foods did not
involve a deficiency action, it did address squarely the question whether
state law or federal law applied to federal mortgage loan programs. 84
The result in Kimbell Foods, which incorporated state law as the applica-
ble federal law, was based upon federal common-law doctrine (because
the federal government was a direct party in interest) rather than implied
preemption. 185 In its analysis the Court set forth specific criteria for de-
termining whether a separate federal rule should be developed, or state
law incorporated as the applicable federal rule.'86 Unfortunately, using
180. Whitehead, 904 F.2d at 1363; Vallejo, 660 F. Supp. at 538; Dalton Motors, Inc. v.
Weaver, 446 F. Supp. 711, 714 (D. Minn. 1978) ("[I]f the SBA chooses to seek the procedural
benefits of a summary foreclosure procedure offered by a state, it should be ready to accept as
well the protections the state affords its mortgagors under that procedure.").
181. Davis, 961 F.2d at 608; Shepherd v. Derwinski, 961 F.2d 132, 133 (9th Cir. 1992);
Connelly, 961 F.2d at 130; Jones, 699 F. Supp. at 800.
182. Recognizing that deficiency actions provide relatively small recoveries and constitute
a "threat of... liability [which] can linger for months or years and can delay and complicate a
veteran's recovery from the financial catastrophe that already claimed his or her home," Con-
gress in 1989 amended the VA loan statute to abandon deficiency actions, requiring instead
payment of a fee, at loan origination, to help cover losses from defaults. S. REP. No. 101-126,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 265, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1470, 1671; Veterans' Benefits
Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-237, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 2062 (codified at 38 U.S.C.
§ 3703(e) (1991)).
183. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). Of the ten decisions dealing with state antideficiency laws ren-
dered after the 1979 Kimbell Foods decision, see supra notes 173 & 174, six declined to find
preemption and applied state antideficiency laws. See supra note 174.
184. Kimbell Foods involved the specific question of whether state laws governing lien pri-
ority applied to federal programs. See infra notes 229-31, 287-94 and accompanying text.
185. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 726.
186. Determining that federal law rather than state law applies is, however, only the
threshold question and, as it turns out, the easy one. The court must then consider whether
(1) there is a need for a nationally uniform body of law, (2) application of state law would
frustrate objectives of the federal program, and (3) application of federal rules would disrupt
commercial relationships based on state law. Id. at 728-29.
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these enhanced criteria, which are at once more specific and more flexi-
ble, lower courts have reached diametrically opposed conclusions with
respect to the same federal program.
187
B. State Statutory Rights of Redemption
Slightly over half of the states recognize some form of post-foreclo-
sure right of redemption, extending either to the original mortgagor
alone or to subordinate lien holders as well.188 In affirming the signifi-
cance of such a right, at least as to junior creditors, Congress has decided
that whenever the federal government has a lien on property it is entitled
to a one-year right of redemption following judicial foreclosure,189 and
that such right takes precedence over state laws to the contrary.190 Con-
gress acts, at least in this context, primarily to protect the federal govern-
ment's rights as a creditor rather than as an arbiter of a fair allocation of
rights and duties among debtors and creditors. Indicative of this fact is
the requirement that when the federal government is foreclosing HUD-
insured multifamily mortgages, no post-foreclosure rights of redemption
exist. 191
Whether a state statutory right of redemption is applicable to fed-
187. Compare United States v. Vallejo, 660 F. Supp. 535, 539 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (federal
law governs VA deficiency action, but state law may be applied because there is no real conflict
with federal program objectives) with Jones v. Turnage, 699 F. Supp. 795, 801-02 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (federal law governs VA deficiency actions, and uniform rule should be applied in order
to protect federal program objectives), aff'd sub. nom. Jones v. Derwinski, 914 F.2d 1496 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1309 (1991).
188. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1988). The statutory right of redemption expressly does not
apply when the subordinate lien of the United States is an FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed
loan. Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 1701k (1988) (FHA loans); 38 U.S.C. § 1820(d) (1988) (VA loans). A
federal tax lien carries with it a 120-day right of redemption following a nonjudicial foreclosure
of a senior lien if the senior lienor provided appropriate notice. 26 U.S.C. § 7425(c), (d)
(1988). If notice is not given, the tax lien continues to encumber the property. Id.
190. United States v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 305, 307-08 (1960).
But see Dupnik v. United States, 848 F.2d 1476, 1480 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the federal
redemption statute was not intended to preempt state requirements concerning advance notice
of intent to redeem).
191. 12 U.S.C. § 3713(d) (1988). The inconsistent policies of Congress concerning post-
foreclosure rights of redemption have been made clear:
How Congress could have concluded that the federal government should have the
benefit of statutory redemption, but not be subject to its burdens, at first glance seems
puzzling. In fact, however, while the 1981 legislation was strongly motivated by a
Congressional desire to create a uniform and expeditious federal foreclosure remedy,
there is no evidence to suggest that Congress was aware of the double standard it was
creating. Otherwise, one would be tempted to conclude that Congress was unwilling
to subscribe to the old adage that "what is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the
gander."
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 26, § 8.4, at 617.
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eral mortgage programs is an issue which, similar to state antideficiency
laws, has received widely divergent treatment. 192 Of eleven federal dis-
trict and appellate court opinions between 1967 and 1986 that addressed
this issue, six rejected the application of state redemption rights' 93 and
five held such rights to be binding on the federal programs.1 94 In virtu-
ally all of these decisions, the courts rather easily concluded that federal
law, rather than state law, governed the issue.' 95 The initial decisions
concluded that unless Congress or the federal agencies expressed an in-
tent to incorporate a state statutory right of redemption, the state right
did not apply because "[i]t would be contrary to the teaching of every
case that we have cited to hold that there is a different federal policy in
each state, thus making FHA 'subject to the vagaries of the laws of the
several states.' 196 The decisions began to divide when several courts
concluded, following Kimbell Foods,'97 that recognition of the applicabil-
ity of federal law is but the initial issue, with the possible selection of
state law as the appropriate federal rule for decision constituting the ma-
jor issue. Each of the courts that held state statutory rights of redemp-
tion to be applicable found that state law concerns were paramount and
adopted the state law as the federal law.198 Kimbell Foods, however, does
not explain sufficiently these differences. Three decisions which upheld
preemption, although rendered after Kimbell Foods, did not rely upon
Kimbell Foods in their analysis; 199 in two of those decisions, moreover,
192. See Kenneth C. Day, Note, Federal Courts-Choice of Controlling Law in Cases In-
volving Federally Insured Mortgages, 49 N.C. L. Rev. 358, 360 (1971) (pointing out that courts
apply various analyses to determine whether state or federal law controls in these cases).
193. United States v. Victory Highway Village, Inc., 662 F.2d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 164 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Stadium Apts.,
Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lynch v. United States, 400 U.S. 926
(1970); United States v. Curry, 561 F. Supp. 429,430 (D. Kan. 1983); John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Bruening Farms Corp., 537 F. Supp. 936, 938 (N.D. Iowa 1982); United States v.
Montgomery, 268 F. Supp. 787, 788 (D. Kan. 1967).
194. United States v. Pastos, 781 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ellis, 714
F.2d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1975)
(en bane); United States v. Hargrove, 494 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.N.M. 1979); United States v.
Marshall, 431 F. Supp. 888, 892 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
195. This holding is based on the line of reasoning derived from Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), and developed in detail in a 1959 Ninth Circuit decision
that held that federal law applies to the appointment of a receiver. United States v. View Crest
Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959); see, e.g.,
Stadium Apts., 425 F.2d at 360 ("It is settled that the applicable law is federal.").
196. Stadium Apts., 425 F.2d at 364 (quoting Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367).
197. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
198. Pastos, 781 F.2d at 752; Ellis, 714 F.2d at 957; MacKenzie, 510 F.2d at 41-42; Har-
grove, 494 F. Supp. at 24; Marshall, 431 F. Supp. at 892.
199. United States v. Victory Highway Village, Inc., 662 F.2d 488, 497-98 (8th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Curry, 561 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D. Kan. 1983); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
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the courts, as part of their inherent equity powers, granted some form of
additional redemption rights.2 °
C. State Laws Concerning Contractual Waivers
An additional question in preemption analysis involves the enforce-
ability of an agency regulation or contractual provision that expressly
designates the applicable law. In the Supreme Court's threshold decision
United States v. Yazell,2°1 the absence of a federal regulation stating the
applicable law was critical to the Court's refusal to find preemption. 02
Correspondingly, where the underlying contractual documents contain
an express provision that state law protections shall apply, courts have
denied preemption.20 3
Predictably, after Yazell federal agencies began to issue regulations
stating that federal law governed the transactions and required debtors to
waive state law protections.2° Judicial treatment of contractual waivers
required by federal regulations has once again been inconsistent. Two
cases have held such waivers to be enforceable against the debtor even
though the right in question was not waivable under state law.205 In five
other decisions, the courts have refused to enforce such waivers, defer-
ring instead to state policies prohibiting such waivers.2"6 These decisions
clearly imply that the contract does not necessarily control the determi-
nation of whether to apply state law or a distinct federal rule.20
7
Co. v. Bruening Farms Corp., 537 F. Supp. 936, 938 (N.D. Iowa 1982). None of these three
decisions even discussed or cited Kimbell Foods.
200. Curry, 561 F. Supp. at 431 (granting debtor redemption rights for 180 days after fore-
closure sale); United States v. Montgomery, 268 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Kan. 1967) (granting
debtor redemption rights for 60 days after foreclosure sale); see also United States v. West
Willow Apts., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 755, 758 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (holding that FHA may grant a
right of redemption even if not required to do so).
201. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
202. Id. at 349-51.
203. United States v. Stewart, 523 F.2d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jo-
hansson, 467 F. Supp. 84, 85 (D. Me. 1979).
204. See 31 Fed. Reg. 10,466 (1966) (regulations issued by SBA shortly after the decision
in Yazell).
205. United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572, 574 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978); United States v. Curry, 561 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D. Kan. 1983). A third decision en-
forced a contractual waiver, but the rights in question could be waived under state law. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bruening Farms Corp., 537 F. Supp. 936, 938 (N.D. Iowa
1982).
206. Great Southwest Life Ins. Co. v. Frazier, 860 F.2d 896, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Pastos, 781 F.2d 747, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953,
955-57 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 999 n.2, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Hargrove, 494 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.N.M. 1979).
207. "[C]ontractual provisions do not have the force of federal law and do not foreclose the
question of what the federal rule is." Pastos, 781 F.2d at 750.
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D. State Notice Requirements
Cases involving state notice requirements do not show a clear pat-
tern of federal preemption. Under the rationale of Shimer,20 8 as clarified
in Fidelity Federal,209 regulations and procedures promulgated by a fed-
eral mortgage program can preempt state laws if they are intended to
provide the exclusive source of rules and if there is a direct conflict with
state laws.21° Six judicial decisions, rendered within a short period of
time, reveal the difficulty of applying such standards to state foreclosure
notice requirements.
Four of these decisions, United States v. Black,2 ' United States v.
Royer,21 2 United States v. Mikolaitis,21 3 and United States v. Spears,214
considered whether Pennsylvania statutes governing notice to a mortga-
gor in default were applicable to the Farmer's Home Administration
(FmHA) loan program. Black, Royer, and Spears each concluded that
since federal law governed the program, state notice requirements were
not applicable.21 5 Mikolaitis, however, reached the opposite conclu-
sion-that the FmHA program was subject to state notice require-
ments.21 6 A fifth decision, United States v. Whitney,217 applied a New
York statutory notice requirement to a VA deficiency action after con-
cluding there was no preemption. Whitney offered a second rationale in
rejecting the VA deficiency action-that the VA failed to provide the no-
tice to the debtor required by due process.21 8 This rationale became the
basis for the sixth decision, United States v. Murdock,21 9 which denied
summary judgment to the VA in light of questions concerning whether
the VA provided constitutionally sufficient notice to the debtor.220
The reasoning of these six decisions, both implicitly and explicitly,
reflects the chaos prompted by the effects of federal participation in real
208. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
209. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
210. Id. at 152-54.
211. 622 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
212. 683 F. Supp. 484 (M.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd without opinion, 815 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1987).
213. 682 F. Supp. 798 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
214. 859 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1988).
215. See Spears, 859 F.2d at 291; Royer, 683 F. Supp. at 486; Black, 622 F. Supp. at 672-73.
216. Mikolaitis, 682 F. Supp. at 802. Curiously, the same federal district judge, Judge
Caldwell, issued the opinions in both Royer and Mikolaitis.
217. 602 F. Supp. 722 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
218. Id. at 731-33.
219. 627 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
220. Id. at 277-78. Whether state action is present in a nonjudicial foreclosure, even when
the debt is insured or guaranteed by a federally related entity, remains very much an open
question. See infra notes 452-65 and accompanying text.
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estate finance. Black and Royer affirmed preemption by relying primarily
on the proposition that federal law governs the rights and duties of the
parties to the federal loan program because of the Supremacy Clause and
the need to protect the funds of the United States.22' Whitney, on the
other hand, reasoned that preemption by implication (through federal
regulations) is required only when there is an inconsistency between state
and federal requirements which cannot be reconciled and a federal
agency could easily meet state notice requirements.222 The Whitney
court also concluded that the state notice requirement is not an obstacle
to the purposes of the federal program.223 In both Mikolaitis, which de-
clined to find preemption, and Spears, which found preemption, the
courts relied upon the criteria set forth in Kimbell Foods.224 Both courts
concluded that there was no compelling need for national uniformity in
the FmHA foreclosure notice requirements.225 Similarly, both courts
concluded that application of state law would not frustrate the objectives
of the federal program.226 Mikolaitis found that application of federal
law would frustrate commercial relationships based on state law and de-
nied preemption.227 In contrast Spears held that when the dispute is
solely between the government and its debtor, and no third parties are
affected, there is no frustration of commercial relationships and state law
should not apply.
228
E. State Laws Concerning Lien Priority
Before 1979, when questions arose as to the applicable law for dis-
putes concerning lien priorities involving a federal program, courts
tended to conclude, on the basis of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States229 and the need to protect the federal treasury, that federal law
governed the dispute, with the result that federal programs were not sub-
ject to state lien priority laws.230 The Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods
221. United States v. Royer, 683 F. Supp. 484, 486 (M.D. Pa. 1986) ("Federal law controls
the rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement .... ), aff'd without opinion, 815
F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Black, 622 F. Supp. 669, 672-73 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
222. Whitney, 602 F. Supp. at 728; see also United States v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), 785
F.2d 1553, 1556 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that state notice requirements are applicable to
FmHA program because there is no inherent conffict).
223. Whitney, 602 F. Supp. at 729.
224. 440 U.S. 715 (1979); see supra note 186; infra text accompanying notes 287-97.
225. United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 284, 290 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Mikolaitis,
682 F. Supp. 798, 802 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
226. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290; Mikolaitis, 682 F. Supp. at 802.
227. Mikolaitis, 682 F. Supp. at 802.
228. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290-91.
229. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; infra notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Clark Inv. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 7, 9 (9th Cir. 1966) (explaining that
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directly addressed this issue and concluded that while federal law gov-
erned the dispute, state laws could nonetheless be incorporated as the
applicable federal law.23' At least in this context Kimbell Foods has re-
sulted in relative consistency. Most courts have concluded that because
selection of a federal rule would seriously disrupt commercial relation-
ships predicated on state laws, state laws of lien priority should be
adopted as the rule of decision.232 This result has been reached when the
conflict is between federal liens and local government liens, 233 as well as
when the conflicting liens may derive from application of the state com-
mercial code234 or state landlord-tenant laws.235
Despite this relative consistency, the apparent flexibility of the Kim-
bell Foods criteria has led some courts to the opposite conclusion. In one
case which provoked a rare dissent from denial of certiorari to the
Supreme Court,236 the Eighth Circuit held that in an action involving a
claim by FmHA to a lien on crops, "adoption of state law ... would
federal law governs the application of rents collected during the redemption period following
foreclosure of FHA loan); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 715-16 (3d Cir. 1963)
(concluding that FmHA cattle loan program regulations preempt state laws), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 909 (1964).
231. United States v. K imbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727, 740 (1979).
232. Federal Land Bank v. Ferguson, 896 F.2d 1244, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (adopting state law to resolve conflict between relative priorities of FLB liens, FmHA
liens, and third party liens); United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc., 800 F.2d 1232,
1233-37 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that FmHA lien claim to cattle governed by state law); United
States v. Progressive Farmers Mktg. Agency, 788 F.2d 1327, 1329 (8th Cir. 1986) (incorporat-
ing state law in order to determine FmHA claim); United States v. Tugwell, 779 F.2d 5, 7 (4th
Cir. 1985) (holding state law controls FmHA suit for conversion of combine); Chicago Title
Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 708 F.2d 804, 807-11 (Ist Cir. 1983) (holding that state law
determines priority of mechanic's lien over HUD lien); United States v. S.K.A. Assocs., 600
F.2d 513, 514-15 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that state law is to be applied in dispute between
SBA claim to personalty of debtor and landlord's lien).
233. United States v. Tipton, 898 F.2d 770, 771-72 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that SBA lien
is subject to governmental tax liens); Pearlstein v. United States Small Business Admin., 719
F.2d 1169, 1177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that District of Columbia law applies to question
of relative priority of SBA lien and lien for unpaid sales taxes); United States v. Ravaali
County Creamery, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 481, 482-84 (D. Mont. 1987) (holding that state law
controls conflict between SBA lien being foreclosed and county claim for penalties and inter-
ests on taxes); United States v. Dansby, 509 F. Supp. 188, 191 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (holding that
state law governs priority of real estate tax liens). But cf. More v. United States, 505 F. Supp,
612, 614 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that FmHA has superior interest as against purchaser
under tax deed); Sims v. Smith, 502 F. Supp. 609, 610 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (same).
234. See, e.g., United States v. Lattauzio, 748 F.2d 559, 562 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Since there
is no Act of Congress to the contrary, we shall assume, in our disposition of the present case,
that in fashioning the governing rule the [UCC] of [New Mexico] is incorporated . . ").
235. See, e.g., S.K.A. Assocs., 600 F.2d at 514-15 (holding that state law is to be applied in
dispute between SBA claim to personalty of debtor and landlord's lien).
236. United States v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 475 U.S. 1053, 1054 (1986) (White, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari).
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conflict with the federal interests present in the FmHA loan pro-
gram." '237 Other circuit courts have reasoned that state law applies only
when a federal rule has not been announced,238 or when there is no need
to protect the federal lender "from the vagaries of state law. ,239
F Appointment of Receivers
Insofar as the power to appoint a receiver to receive rents and profits
or to take possession of property is within the equitable discretion of the
court,24 decisions addressing the authority of a federal agency to obtain
the appointment of a receiver pending foreclosure have uniformly ap-
proved such an appointment. In many of these decisions, courts have
relied primarily upon contractual authorization for such receiverships.241
When the underlying contractual documents are silent on this point,
courts have relied upon the need for national uniformity and "the federal
policy to protect the treasury and to promote the security of federal in-
vestment which in turn promotes the prime purpose of the [National
Housing] Act," concluding that federal law, not state law, governs the
appointment of a receiver.242 Thus, state law criteria for appointment of
receivers have been simply irrelevant.243
G. State Statutes of Limitations
Congress has spoken directly and clearly regarding the applicable
statute of limitations governing actions on a contract to which the United
States is a party, 2 " and express preemption of state statutes of limitations
237. United States v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, Inc., 764 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986).
238. See, eg., United States v. Kennedy, 738 F.2d 584, 586 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that
federal law applies to FmHA suit for conversion because Kimbell Foods applies only in the
absence of a federal rule, and here the federal rule was established by an earlier case).
239. United States v. Landmark Park & Assocs., 795 F.2d 683, 687 (8th Cir. 1986).
240. 1 STORY, supra note 39, at 132-35.
241. United States v. Queen's Court Apts., Inc., 296 F.2d 534, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1961);
United States v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 573 F. Supp. 1317, 1318-19 (N.D. Ill.
1983); United States v. Mountain Village Co., 424 F. Supp. 822, 828 (D. Mass. 1976).
242. United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1960); see United States v. Chester Park Apts., Inc., 332 F.2d 1, 4-5
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964).
243. United States v. Sylacauga Properties, Inc., 323 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Drexel View II, Ltd., 661 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
244. The applicable statute of limitations is six years for actions brought by the United
States on a contract to which it is a party. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988). As a junior lienor the
United States has one year following the foreclosure sale pursuant to a senior lien in which to
redeem the property from the foreclosure. Id. § 2410(c) (1988).
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has been found.24 5 Because of this express preemption, courts generally
have not undertaken the multifactored analysis of Kimbell Foods.246 The
six-year federal statute of limitations applies only to actions arising out of
a contract and does not bar an action, beyond that time period, to fore-
close a mortgage held by the federal government.247
In each of these critical areas of real estate finance law, the very
presence of federal participation has resulted in chaos in the determina-
tion of applicable law. There is little consistency either in reasoning or in
result, within a circuit or among the circuits, in the determination of the
governing law when a federal agency is directly or indirectly involved in
a real estate finance transaction. Courts invoke the talisman of implied
preemption or federal common law in entirely unpredictable manners,
relying upon different criteria, each interpreted in significantly different
ways.
V. PREEMPTION AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The critical constitutional doctrines for determination of applicable
law in this context are the preemption doctrine and federal common law.
Both doctrines are far easier to accept in theory than to apply in fact.
Both doctrines invoke the criteria of "the need for national uniformity"
and "protection of federal interests" yet afford broad judicial discretion
in reaching conclusions. As developed, both doctrines fail to reflect the
inherent differences between federal market regulation and federal mar-
ket participation. As applied, both doctrines have permitted, in inconsis-
tent fashion, the federal government's involvement as a creditor to
override the states' allocation of rights among creditors and debtors.
A. The Constitutional Doctrines
1. Preemption Doctrine
The constitutional bases for federal preemption of state real estate
245. United States v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308 (1960).
246. United States v. Hanson, 649 F. Supp. 100, 105 (D. Me. 1985); United States v. Kurtz,
525 F. Supp. 734, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd without opinion, 688 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982). A state statute imposing a time limitation for confirmation of a
foreclosure as a precondition to a deficiency action has been held to be preempted by federal
regulations, although this conclusion was reached before the decision in Kimbell Foods.
United States v. Merrick Sponsor Corp., 421 F.2d 1076, 1078-79 (2d Cir. 1970). A different
result is not only possible but probable under Kimbell Foods and more recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.
247. Westnau Land Corp. v. United States Small Business Admin., 785 F. Supp. 41, 43
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); Curry v. United States Small Business Admin., 679 F. Supp. 966, 970 (N.D.
Cal. 1987); Cracco v. Cox, 66 A.D.2d 447, 448, 414 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (1979).
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finance laws are first, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution24 and
second, the Commerce Clause.2 49 Although at times in our constitu-
tional history it has been believed that the Commerce Clause was inher-
ently limited in its reach,250 "[c]ontemporary commerce clause doctrine
grants Congress such broad power that judicial review of the affirmative
authorization for congressional action is largely a formality." '251 While
certain internal constitutional constraints,252 and arguably Tenth
Amendment principles of federalism,253 necessarily limit the reach of the
Commerce Clause, explicit congressional action in the area of real estate
finance in general, and housing in particular, is well within the scope of
the Commerce Clause.
When Congress expressly and unequivocally declares its intention to
preempt state laws, courts will sustain such preemption as long as it is
otherwise within constitutional limits.254 Congress can expressly address
the question of the preemptive effect of federal law in a number of differ-
ent ways. For instance, Congress can enact statutes in particular areas
and yet expressly disclaim any intent to preempt similar state laws.255 It
248. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land .... ." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
249. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce... among the several
States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
250. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 4.4-4.9, at 138-63 (4th ed. 1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL
LAW § 5.4, at 305-10, § 6-2 to 6-4, at 403-08 (2d ed. 1988).
251. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758 (1982) ("It is
not for us to say whether the means chosen by Congress represent the wisest choice. It is
sufficient that Congress was not irrational in concluding that limited federal regulation... was
essential to protect interstate commerce."); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 250, § 5-8, at
129-30 ("Today, the [Supreme] Court will uphold the decisions of Congress so long as there is
some rational argument for finding that the items that the Congress regulates fall within the
commerce power."); TRIBE, supra note 250, at § 5.8, at 316.
252. Such constraints take the form primarily of restrictions flowing from (1) the separa-
tion of powers, such as the grant of executive power, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, or judicial
authority, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; (2) the specification of individual rights in the Bill of
Rights, U.S. CONST. amend. I-VIII; or (3) specific prohibitions to Congress such as the denial
of power to tax exports from any state. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
253. Although the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985), overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), and held that commercial regulation by Congress of a governmental activity would be
sustained, most agree that Tenth Amendment limitations could, at some point, stand as a
barrier to congressional action ostensibly justified on the basis of the Commerce Clause. See
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 250, § 4.10, at 183-87; TRIBE, supra note 250, § 5-20, at 378
n.4, 397-98.
254. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985).
255. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988) (recognizing expressly the jurisdiction of state
courts over state criminal law matters).
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can establish federal standards and yet expressly permit state regulations
containing additional requirements, the approach taken in the case of
most real estate finance disclosure laws.256 It can expressly preempt all
state laws concerning a particular substantive issue, but nonetheless per-
mit states to "override" that preemption by subsequent legislative act-
the path chosen in congressional preemption of usury laws and adjusta-
ble rate mortgages.25 7
The difficult preemption questions arise not when Congress has ex-
pressly displaced state law, but when Congress has enacted a statute on a
particular subject matter, or has created a federal program, and has
failed to state clearly whether it intended to displace state law. In these
cases of implied preemption, courts must "examine congressional in-
tent. ' 25 ' Ascertaining the preemptive intent of Congress, not surpris-
ingly, has yielded a considerable range of factors, or relevant criteria,
including: (1) whether congressional legislation completely "occupies the
field," (2) whether there is a conflict between the requirements of state
law and federal law, (3) whether the federal interests and the need to
protect direct federal interests dominate, (4) whether there is a need for
national uniformity, (5) whether state law would frustrate the specific
objectives of the federal programs, and (6) whether application of federal
law would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.
25 9
Given this range of factors and the diverse conclusions reached from
them, it is an understatement to suggest that "none of these expressions
provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional
yardstick.
2 60
Any implied preemption analysis must begin with the question
whether there is a presumption against implied preemption. Although
the Supreme Court has not enunciated such a presumption applicable in
all preemption contexts, it has on several occasions strongly suggested
that "[w]here ... the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted has
been traditionally occupied by the States 'we start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act.' ,261 Property law has been identified as one area de-
256. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes I11 & 118 and accompanying text.
258. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982).
259. See infra Part V. B, notes 303-91 and accompanying text.
260. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
261. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (citations omitted) (quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S,
199, 202-03 (1952) ("The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed."). But
see Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[A]
presumption against preemption cannot be supported.").
[Vol. 71
REAL ESTATE FINANCE
serving such a negative presumption. 62 This presumption against pre-
emption, however, tends to be weak at best, 263 for even when the
Supreme Court seems to have both stated and applied the presumption, it
acknowledges that certain factors can override it.2 4 An alternative for-
mulation of this presumption is "that federal regulation of a field of com-
merce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the
absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has un-
mistakably so ordained. ' 265 Read literally, this presumption would seem
to indicate that only a direct conflict could be the basis for implied pre-
emption. Unfortunately, however, the Court obscured the possible clar-
ity of such a rule by its analysis, immediately following the stated
presumption, of legislative history and the significance of national uni-
formity as a possible basis for preemption.266
Of the numerous factors which may provide the basis for implied
preemption, no single factor seems to be a necessary condition, and any
factor alone may be a sufficient condition. The existence of detailed fed-
eral regulations is the clearest example of this principle. When Congress
has delegated rule-making authority to an agency, the agency's regula-
tions may be the basis for preemption of state law. "Federal regulations
have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. 2 67 The existence of
such regulations, however, even in a relatively comprehensive form, may
alone be insufficient, as the Supreme Court is "even more reluctant to
infer pre-emption from the comprehensiveness of regulations than from
the comprehensiveness of statutes.
268
2. Government as a Party-Federal Common Law
Because federal intervention in real estate finance involves not
merely market regulation but direct market participation as well, the sec-
ond constitutional doctrine, federal common law, comes into play.
262. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1717 (1991) (citing Reconstruc-
tion Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946)).
263. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746-47 (1981).
264. See, e.g., Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
715-16 (1985) (stating that presumption in favor of state regulation of health and safety mat-
ters can only be overcome by showing that federal law occupies the whole field or that there is
a direct conflict); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981) (declaring
that specific statutes, not general statements of national policy, must be the basis for a conflict
that overcomes presumption against preemption).
265. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1962).
266. Id. at 146-52.
267. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
268. Hillsborough County, Fla., 471 U.S. at 717.
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Notwithstanding the pronouncement in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins'69
that "[t]here is no federal general common law,"27 both the Supreme
Court271 and commentators 72 recognize the necessity of federal com-
mon law in particular contexts. The more obvious contexts include in-
terstate competition for water resources,2 73  Native American land
claims, 274 constitutional rights, 275 and international relations.276 Federal
common law, however, is far broader in its reach than these relatively
discrete categories, and encompasses "any rule of federal law created by
a court (usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of
that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or
congressional."
277
In 1943, in Clearfield Trust,2 78 the Supreme Court applied federal
common law to the rights and duties of commercial paper issued by the
federal government. Interpreted in its strongest sense, Clearfield Trust
stands for the proposition that "federal law governs questions involving
the rights of the United States arising under nationwide federal pro-
grams. ' '279 Thus, with respect to virtually every federal loan program,
whether federally insured, guaranteed, or involving a direct federal loan,
including the loan programs of FHA,28 ° VA, 281 SBA,282 FmHA,283 and
269. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
270. Id. at 78.
271. The Supreme Court, on the same day it decided Erie, ruled that federal common law
applied to interstate disputes on water resource allocation. Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
272. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 883, 953-62 (1986); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Com-
mon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-22 (1964); Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Fed-
eral Law"- Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 810-32 (1957).
273. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
274. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 236 (1985).
275. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971).
276. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-12 (1964); see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.2.4 (1989).
277. Field, supra note 272, at 890. Alternatively, federal common law has been defined as
"any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal
text-whether or not that rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either a
conventional or an unconventional sense." Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985).
278. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
279. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979) (citing Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943)).
280. E.g., United States v. Stadium Apts., Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 926 (1970); United States v. Chester Park Apts., Inc., 332 F.2d 1, 3 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380,
382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
281. E.g., Whitehead v. Derwinski, 904 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990).
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HUD,2 8 4 appellate courts have concluded, on the basis of Clearfield
Trust, that federal common law governs the dispute. This assertion of
authority of federal law is the "first prong" of the Clearfield Trust
analysis.
285
The judicial determination that federal law applies, however, is and
should be only the first question. The "second prong" of the Clearfield
Trust analysis involves what the content of the federal rule should be.286
In Kimbell Foods,2" the Supreme Court considered the question of the
relative priority of federal loan program liens and private liens. In brief
fashion the Court concluded, on the basis of Clearfield Trust, that "the
priority of liens stemming from federal lending programs must be deter-
mined with reference to federal law."' 288 The more difficult task, the
Court suggested, is to determine whether the content of the federal law
should be a judicially fashioned uniform rule or whether applicable state
law should be incorporated as the rule of decision.289 The Court identi-
fied three criteria for making such a determination: (1) whether the fed-
eral programs by their nature necessitated a uniform federal rule;
(2) whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of
the federal programs; and (3) whether application of a federal rule would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.290 In the con-
text presented, the Court unanimously concluded that state law should
be incorporated as federal law.291 The Court held, first, that SBA and
FHA loan programs did not necessitate national uniformity insofar as
such loan programs are frequently tailored to state laws and are individu-
ally negotiated.292 Second, incorporation of state laws would not frus-
trate the purposes of the federal programs except in the narrow sense of
possibly making it more difficult for the government, as creditor, to
recoup the loan.29 3 Third, adoption of a different federal rule would seri-
282. E.g., Great Southwest Life Ins. Co. v. Frazier, 860 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 1979).
283. E.g., Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 726; United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc.,
800 F.2d 1232, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 954-55 (9th Cir.
1983).
284. E.g., United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 164 (6th Cir. 1979).
285. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1972); Mishkin,
supra note 272, at 802.
286. Friendly, supra note 272, at 410; Mishkin, supra note 272, at 802.
287. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
288. Id. at 726.
289. Id. at 727-29.
290. Id. at 728-29.
291. Id. at 740.
292. Id. at 729-33.
293. Id. at 733-38.
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ously undermine commercial expectations based upon state law.294 Kim-
bell Foods thus affirms the importance of evaluating state law concerns
while acknowledging the authority of federal common law.
Whether a presumption exists favoring the displacement of state law
in the second prong of the federal common law analysis is not clear.2 95
When the United States is a contracting party and the applicable state
law is hostile to the interests of the United States, state law will not be
applied. z96 Conversely, even though the United States may be a con-
tracting party, at times the federal interest may be "'too speculative, far
too remote a possibility to justify the application of federal law to trans-
actions essentially of local concern.' ,297
3. Doctrinal Chaos
The overlapping and ambiguous nature of the constitutional doc-
trines of preemption and federal common law has been a primary cause
of the chaos in judicial reasoning and judicial results in real estate finance
cases. One might plausibly assume, for example, that the preemption
doctrine will be applied when Congress acts as a market regulator, not a
market participant, and that federal common law will be applied when
the federal government is a direct market participant. Such has not been
the case, however. In one of the two leading Supreme Court opinions
involving direct market participation, Shimer,298 the Court undertook its
analysis solely on the basis of federal preemption doctrine, while in Kim-
bell Foods, the second leading opinion in the area, the Court based its
reasoning entirely upon federal common law and Clearfield Trust.
299
Both lines of constitutional reasoning cite as relevant factors the
need for national uniformity and the need to protect the objectives of
federal programs. The preemption doctrine begins with a weak presump-
tion in favor of state law, yet incorporates numerous other relevant fac-
294. Id. at 739-40.
295. In a weak sense, of course, the Rules of Decision Act, enacted in 1789, creates some
presumption that "[tihe laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). Some commentators feel comfortable with the proposition that there is
"a strong presumption against the federal courts fashioning common law to decide cases."
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 276, § 6.1, at 293.
296. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 597 (1972).
297. Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1977) (quoting Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1956)).
298. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
299. A second United States Supreme Court opinion acknowledged the Clearfield Trust
doctrine, yet held that the SBA loan program was subject to state laws. United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354-58 (1965).
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tors-none of which expressly include the potential impact on state law.
When the government is a party the assumption appears to be that fed-
eral law governs without any presumption as to the content of the law.
Federal common law, however, does include as a relevant factor the po-
tential negative impact on state commercial relationships, a factor largely
absent from preemption analysis.
The problem is not solely the presence of judicial discretion in deter-
mining congressional intent to preempt state laws, nor solely the applica-
bility of the federal common law to disputes to which the government is a
party. The problem, for federal intervention in real estate finance, is that
the fluid multifactored tests, which include the need for national uni-
formity and the protection of federal interests, are simply insufficient to
bear the normative or predictive significance expected of them.3" Every
federal loan program exposes the federal treasury to a risk of loss. Every
secured real estate transaction exposes the federal government, as a se-
cured creditor, to state laws designed to strike a balance between debtors
and creditors. Congress has, with increasing frequency, determined that
it is necessary and appropriate to legislate substantive issues concerning
all "federally related mortgage loans. ' ' 30 1 Congress has also demon-
strated that it can act expressly to preempt state laws which offer debtor
or third party protections when it desires solely to protect the federal
treasury or the federal program.30 2 The authority to find implied pre-
emption, whether in congressional market regulation or by application of
federal common law when the government is a party, becomes an unbri-
dled power yielding unpredictable results when the relevant factors are
so fluid.
B. An Analysis of Criteria
1. Occupation of the Field
One of the most traditional, and least useful, tests for determining if
state law has been displaced by federal law is whether Congress "has
taken the particular subject-matter in hand,, 30 3 or authorized a
"'scheme of federal regulation.., so pervasive as to make reasonable the
300. See Field, supra note 272, at 928 ("The absence of an articulated standard, or even an
accepted way of looking at federal common-law questions, has exacerbated the inconsistency
and unpredictability that in any event accompanies a system vesting so much discretion in the
judiciary.").
301. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 124, 189-90 and accompanying text.
303. Charleston W.C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915); TRIBE,
supra note 250, § 6-26, at 491.
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inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.' ,o
Preemption by occupation of the field is most evident in areas where
Congress has inherent concerns such as alien registration,3 0 5 or where
Congress has created and empowered a national regulatory agency.
30 6
In Shimer 30 7 the Supreme Court seemed to adopt the tenor of this
test in holding that the regulations of the Veterans Administration pre-
empted state laws limiting deficiency actions against debtors. "We have
no doubt that this regulatory scheme, complete as it is in every detail,
was intended to provide the whole and exclusive source of protection of
the interests of the Veterans Administration as guarantor and was, to this
extent, meant to displace inconsistent state law."' 308 It would be a mis-
take, however, to view Shimer as standing for the proposition that be-
cause the agency has issued extensive regulations, state laws are
inapplicable. As later decisions made clear, the existence of comprehen-
sive regulations is clearly less significant for implied preemption purposes
than the existence of a comprehensive statute.30 9 Many federal programs
require extensive regulations, but it does not follow that such regulations
indicate the intent of Congress to displace state laws.310 Occupation of
the field, as evidenced by extensive regulations, is a sufficient basis for
implied preemption only if other criteria are also present, such as a direct
conflict with state laws or the need for national uniformity.
304. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
305. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941) (holding that state alien registra-
tion act was preempted by federal act).
306. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959) (holding
that state tort action for picketing was preempted by National Labor Relations Act); Farmers
Educ. Union & Coop. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959) (holding that state libel ac-
tions were preempted by FCC regulations).
307. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
308. Id. at 381.
309. See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717
(1985) ("We are even more reluctant to infer pre-emption from the comprehensiveness of regu-
lations than from the comprehensiveness of statutes.").
310. As the Court put it:
To infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a problem comprehensively is
virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency decides to step into a
field, its regulations will be exclusive. Such a rule, of course, would be inconsistent
with the federal-state balance in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence.
Id. See New York Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1972) ("We reject...
the contention that pre-emption is to be inferred merely from the comprehensive character of
the federal work incentive provisions.").
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2. Conflict Preemption
In the event of a conflict between the requirements of federal law
(including federal regulations) and the requirements of state law, the
Supremacy Clause requires the displacement of state law.3 1' Although
the Supreme Court 312 and commentators313 have suggested that preemp-
tion takes three forms-express, implied, and conflict preemption-in
fact, conflict preemption is a form of implied preemption.314
Courts have construed the existence of a conflict as a basis for pre-
emption in three different ways. First, it refers to a situation in which
required or prohibited behavior under federal law is directly and com-
pletely contrary to that required or prohibited under state law. In this
context "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility. ' ' 315 Second, it refers to a situation where application of
state laws may be "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes" of the federal statute or program.316 Third, it has been
used to evaluate situations in which federal law prescribes a minimum
standard of behavior, but the question is uncertain as to whether addi-
tional state standards or requirements may also apply.3 17 The first con-
text, of a conflict yielding a physical impossibility, is a pure conflict, the
second, an instrumental or policy conflict, and the third, no conflict at
all.
An attempt to reconcile or predict the conflict preemption cases, on
anything other than a result-oriented basis, proves no easy task because
the categories overlap and the lines blur.318 A highly skilled advocate
311. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
312. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956).
313. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 250, § 9.1, at 312; TRIBE, supra note 250, § 6-35, at
479.
314. This assumes, of course, that it is not a conflict addressed by express preemption.
315. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); see
United States v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 301 (1960) (holding that
twelve-month federal statutory right of redemption controls over conflicting state law which
permitted a junior creditor to redeem only after the twelfth month and before the sixteenth
month). It is entirely plausible, however, that in John Hancock there was no direct conflict
because the interests of the United States, as reflected in the federal statutory history, could
have been adequately served by redemption during the three-month window.
316. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941)).
317. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984) (holding that state tort
law for radiation injuries was not preempted by federal nuclear safety regulations); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 152 (upholding California marketing statute imposing
strict requirements).
318. See TRIBE, supra note 250, § 6-26, at 481-97.
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can always find a conflict when two sovereigns have spoken on similar
subjects, just as such an advocate can almost invariably (save for in-
stances of physical impossibility) find ways to reconcile the words of sep-
arate sovereigns. In evaluating a possible conflict between federal law
and state law, the more important issue is the phrasing of the question
itself-the identification of matters potentially in conflict.
Cases involving potential conflicts between state and federal laws in
real estate finance reveal that when a specific state requirement, or prohi-
bition, is compared to a more general federal program, courts are likely
to find a conflict and displace state law. For example, when a state pro-
hibits a deficiency action after nonjudicial power of sale foreclosures, but
a federal agency nonetheless seeks a deficiency, the result depends in
large measure upon what the court compares for purposes of evaluating
the conflict. If the court weighs the regulations, policies, and goals of the
federal agency seeking the deficiency action against the state prohibition
of deficiency actions in nonjudicial foreclosures, a conflict seems evident,
and courts have used such reasoning to preempt state law.31 9 When,
however, courts have compared the federal goal of obtaining a deficiency
not simply with the particular state antideficiency legislation but with the
broader state system of secured creditors' rights, courts have reached a
different result. For example, when state laws contain alternative meth-
ods by which a secured real estate creditor could preserve rights to a
deficiency action, some courts have refused to find a conflict, holding
instead that the federal agency simply waived its right to a deficiency by
the course of action it selected. 2°
This inappropriate comparison of apples with oranges, or apples
with all fruits, as a way of determining which is sweeter, also occurs
when federal regulations either have not addressed the existence of a
debtor's post-foreclosure right of redemption or have provided for a
waiver of such right. Thus, federal loan programs have been held not
subject to statutory rights of redemption, in order "to assure the protec-
319. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 380-81 (1961); United States v. Gish, 559
F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that the SBA must be allowed to recover deficiencies
whenever state law applies), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); Branden v. Driver, 293 F. Supp.
871, 873 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (holding that the federal policy of collection on its loans must be
considered paramount to any state policy), aff'dper curiam, 441 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1971).
320. Whitehead v. Derwinski, 904 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1990); Carter v. Derwinski,
758 F. Supp. 603, 608 (D. Idaho 1991), reh g granted, 970 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1992). But see
United States v. Davis, 961 F.2d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the VA was not es-
topped by asserting rights under indemnity agreement); Vail v. Derwinski, 946 F.2d 589, 592
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the VA guaranty contract was not affected by non-judicial fore-
closure); Jones v. Turnage, 699 F. Supp. 795, 802 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (rejecting the argument of
waiver by the VA and holding in favor of preemption), aff'd sub. nom. Jones v. Derwinski, 914
F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 1309 (1991).
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tion of the federal program against loss." '321 Again, however, when
courts have examined the statutory right of redemption in the broader
context, the potential adverse impact on the federal treasury has faded.322
When they have examined a contractual waiver, in the federal loan docu-
ments, of state debtor protection laws in the full context of the state poli-
cies prohibiting such waivers in real estate finance, courts have been far
more reluctant to displace state laws.323 State laws setting forth notice
requirements, when examined not merely in the narrow sense of possible
differences with federal notice requirements but in the broader context of
state policies, have been sustained.324
What a court chooses to compare, therefore, will in large measure
determine the existence of a conflict as a basis for implied preemption in
real estate finance. If the court contrasts a narrow and specific state reg-
ulation with an entire federal program and its purposes, policies, and
regulations, the state law will conflict with federal law and yield to it. If,
on the other hand, the court views state law in the broader context of the
state's allocation of rights and duties among secured real estate creditors
and debtors and the interplay of such allocation, the federal program will
more likely yield to state law.
3. Federal Interests
The "dominance of the federal interests" and the "need to protect
direct federal interests" are frequently mentioned factors in an implied
preemption analysis. The strongest such statements by the United States
Supreme Court arise in contexts other than real estate finance, such as
321. United States v. Stadium Apts., Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 926 (1970); see United States v. Victory Highway Village, 662 F.2d 488, 495 (8th Cir.
1981) (holding that HUD has broad discretion to choose its possible remedies when perform-
ing its duties); United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 164-65 (6th Cir. 1979) (recognizing an
overriding federal interest in protecting the funds of the United States).
322. See United States v. Pastos, 781 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that state
redemption laws do not provide complete immunity from the debt as antideficiency laws
might).
323. Compare Great Southwest Life Ins. Co. v. Frazier, 860 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that contractual waiver of state law defense was ineffective), Pastos, 781 F.2d at 752
(holding that contractual waiver was unenforceable because not required by federal law),
United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that overriding federal pur-
pose is not adversely affected, and may even be advanced, by adopting state law), United States
v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the adoption of state law would not
adversely affect federal policies), and United States v. Hargrove, 494 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.N.M.
1979) (holding a contractual waiver unenforceable) with United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572,
574 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding debtor bound by contractual waiver of immunity), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 996 (1978) and United States v. Curry, 561 F. Supp. 429, 431 (D. Kan. 1983) (hold-
ing a contractual waiver enforceable under federal law even if not enforceable under state law).
324. See supra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
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sedition laws325 and alien registration statutes.3 26 In real estate finance,
"federal interests" has been used to refer either to the fiscal concerns of
the federal government in debt collection, or to the more specific objec-
tives of the federal programs.
The logical relevance of federal financial interests is that in order to
achieve the broad objectives of the federal program, the financial integ-
rity of the program is important; in order to protect the financial integ-
rity of the program it is necessary that the federal government, as the
secured creditor, recover on the debt owed to it.3 27 Alternatively, this
factor has been offered simply as a conclusive proposition: "[T]he Fed-
eral policy of collection on its loan must be considered paramount to any
State policy with which we are concerned. ' 328 In one of the most exten-
sively briefed cases on whether federal loan programs are subject to state
statutory rights of redemption, the Ninth Circuit considered, but re-
jected, the argument that state redemption rights constituted a significant
policy judgment of the state concerning the allocation of rights and du-
ties among creditors and debtors.3 29 Precisely because a state redemp-
tion right could cost the government money, the court held it
inapplicable to the federal program. 3 0
325. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956) ("Congress has devised an all-
embracing program for resistance to the various forms of totalitarian aggression.").
326. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941) (stating that such legislation is in a
field which demands broad national authority).
327. See United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 164 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding there is a
federal interest in protecting the funds of the United States and in securing federal investments,
thereby promoting the purposes of the National Housing Act); United States v. View Crest
Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir.) ("[T]he federal policy to protect the treasury
and to promote the security of federal investment which in turn promotes the prime purpose of
the Act ... becomes predominant."), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
328. Branden v. Driver, 293 F. Supp. 871, 873 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'dper curiam, 441 F.2d
1171 (9th Cir. 1971). While the appellate court affirmed the holding of preemption, it evi-
dently disagreed with its wisdom, saying: "Here the government gets, under tragic circum-
stances of the debtor, a deficiency it could not get under California state law. Much can be
said for requiring federal loans to be made under the local law, but we are not now free to
order the California law applicable." Brandon v. Driver, 441 F.2d 1171, 1171 (9th Cir. 1971).
Judge Ely, in dissent, emphasized the presence of the California antideficiency statute as part
of the "ideal of basic fairness" and stressed the importance of such law to the policies of
California. Id. (Ely, J., dissenting).
329. United States v. Stadium Apts., Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir,), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 926 (1970). Judge Ely's intense dissent in this case stressed the need for a contextual
analysis of a state redemption right:
I could not hold that silence on the part of Congress can be taken to effect an abroga-
tion of time-honored state rights, derived from the most exalted principles of equity
and so carefully designed, not only for the protection of debtors and creditors alike,
but also for the promotion of the general economic welfare of the public at large.
Id. at 373 (Ely, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 366-67 ("[The federal government] should not have to hold and manage proper-
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The problem with this argument is that it simply proves too much.
If federal interests are synonymous with federal financial interests, then
all federal mortgage programs will preempt state laws to the extent that
they may impose a cost on the federal government. Because the role of
the federal government as a market participant in real estate finance is
largely the role of a secured creditor, preemption of one half of the credi-
tor-debtor allocation of fights and duties will invariably occur in all fed-
eral mortgage programs. The same problem arises whether one is
following traditional implied preemption doctrine or federal common
law doctrine because the government is a party. To hold that simply
because the federal government is a party to a dispute the rule that favors
the financial interests of the government should prevail, is, in this con-
text, to destroy the historical allocation at law and in equity of real estate
finance obligations.331 It also likely will create havoc precisely because
many state statutes, including the statutory right of redemption, can
serve to benefit not only a debtor but also a creditor.332
The Supreme Court, as well as appellate courts, have recognized the
inadequacy of federal financial interests as a basis for preemption. In
United States v. Yazell,333 the Court reasoned that "[t]he desire of the
Federal Government to collect on its loans is understandable .... But
this serves merely to present the question-not to answer it. Every credi-
tor has the same interest in this respect; every creditor wants to col-
lect." '334 In upholding the application of state law to the federal loan
program, the Court disavowed the proposition that the government's
claim, as a creditor, is absolute.335 Other courts have recognized that
"[i]ncreased costs alone, however, are not a strong enough federal inter-
est to override states' concerns in protecting debtors. 336
ties for any period longer than is absolutely necessary for it to get back its money.... Nor is it
accurate to say that the application of state redemption rights does not tie up government
funds.").
331. As Professor Field has observed, "Such a suggestion is problematic. It smacks of one
party to the controversy deciding the rules in its own favor." Field, supra note 272, at 955.
332. See supra notes 47-49 & 188-91 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that state laws protecting guarantors make it
easier for federal programs to find sureties).
333. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
334. Id. at 348.
335. Id. at 348-49. The Court acknowledged that the magnitude of the federal financial
interest at stake in Yazell was "of little consequence," id. at 343, but nonetheless rejected the
conclusions which could flow from a Clearfield Trust-based argument.
336. United States v. Vallejo, 660 F. Supp. 535, 539 (W.D. Wash. 1987); see United States
v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (holding that federal interests of
protecting federal fisc and purposes of SBA program are insufficient basis to preempt state
antideficiency law); see also United States v. Haddon Haciendas Co., 541 F.2d 777, 784 n.8
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The absence in the Kimbell Foods three-factored analysis for appli-
cation of federal common law of a factor identified solely as "protection
of federal interests" is revealing. In Kimbell Foods the Supreme Court
carefully considered, and rejected, the argument that federal loan pro-
grams deserve special protection unavailable to ordinary commercial
creditors:337 "The Government therefore is in substantially the same po-
sition as private lenders, and the special status it seeks is unnecessary to
safeguard the public fisc." 338 Recognizing the significance of this more
limited delineation of factors has produced an increased number of deci-
sions sustaining the application of state law to federal programs. 339
4. Need for National Uniformity
The need for or desirability of national uniformity is one of two fac-
tors common to both the traditional implied preemption analysis340 and
federal common law analysis; 341 the second common factor being the
frustration of federal program objectives. Congress, however, has largely
avoided complete preemption even in enacting comprehensive legislation
in real estate finance. In the mandatory disclosure laws Congress estab-
lished only minimum disclosure requirements, leaving states free to re-
quire additional disclosures.342 Similarly, when Congress expressly
preempted specific substantive areas such as usury laws or adjustable rate
mortgage laws, states retained authority to override the provisions of fed-
eral law.343 Although Congress has expressly avoided the imposition of
national uniformity in critical areas of real estate finance, the need for
national uniformity resounds in judicial reasoning about real estate
finance.
The "need for national uniformity" factor has appeared in radically
different contexts. In Clearfield Trust,3 4 the Supreme Court considered
whether the commercial paper of the federal government could be sub-
ject to the laws of the different states and concluded that the obligations
(9th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that protection of the public fisc is an insufficient basis for
preemption).
337. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979).
338. Id. at 737.
339. See Whitehead v. Derwinski, 904 F.2d 1362, 1370 (9th Cir. 1990) (attributing court's
shift in analysis to the decision in Kimbell Foods); Great Southwest Life Ins. Co. v. Frazier,
860 F.2d 896, 899-901 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying Kimbell Foods factors to deficiency action
defenses).
340. See, eg., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 377 (1961).
341. See, eg. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
342. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 111 & 118 and accompanying text.
344. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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of the United States under identical instruments should not be "subject
to the vagaries of the laws of the several states," creating a uniform rule
of federal common law.345 Uniformity has also been found desirable in
federal mortgage programs which operate on a nationwide basis and
adopt regulations and policies governing its operations. In Shimer,346 the
Supreme Court concluded that such regulations "were intended to create
a uniform system ' 347 and held that they displaced inconsistent state
law.348 In United States v. Yazell,349 however, the Court distinguished
both Clearfield Trust and Shimer, stating that the loan program "was not
a nationwide act of the Federal Government, emanating in a single form
from a single source," but a specifically negotiated transaction.35°
The problem with the "need for national uniformity" as a basis for
displacing state law is twofold. First, there is a great tendency to think
that what may be desirable for the ease of operation of a program is the
same as that which may be necessary for the success of the operation.
Second, one's initial, often unspoken, premise tends to dictate the result.
If one regards a federal national mortgage program as federal, in the
sense of sovereignty and supremacy, and national, in its essential charac-
ter, state law is likely to be displaced. If, however, one regards a federal
national mortgage program as federal, in the weak sense of the identity of
the sponsor, and national, in its geographical scope, state laws are likely
to prevail.
Except for the specific instances of express congressional action,351
all attempts at establishing uniformity among the states in real estate fi-
nance and foreclosure have failed.352 Although there are significant dif-
ferences among the federal mortgage loan programs in the extent of
uniformity in transactions, 35 3 every federal loan program is jurisdiction-
specific in numerous respects. Most obviously, each program uses the
security instrument recognized in that particular jurisdiction, whether it
is a mortgage, deed of trust, or security deed. With only one recent ex-
345. Id. at 367.
346. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
347. Id. at 377 (interpreting VA regulations).
348. Id. at 381.
349. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
350. Id. at 348 (describing the SBA loan program in contrast to the issuance of United
States commercial paper at stake in Clearfield Trust).
351. See supra notes 97-99, 124 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
353. In general, the loan programs of the SBA and FmHA tend to be more individually
negotiated and tailored to specific transactions. FH-A, VA, and HUD loans tend to be more
uniform in character.
19931
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ception,35 4 Congress has not established a federal mortgage foreclosure
procedure. Each federal loan program presupposes reliance, in the event
of default, on state foreclosure procedures. As the Ninth Circuit recently
noted, "Because federal law does not provide a federal foreclosure proce-
dure, but rather relies upon foreclosure procedures under various state
statutes, it appears that Congress saw no need for 'a nationally uniform
body of law.' ,315 Several different foreclosure methods are available in
some states, while others permit only one approach. 6 When a federal
agency elects a foreclosure procedure (such as a nonjudicial power of sale
foreclosure) not available in other jurisdictions, a lack of national uni-
formity inevitably results.357
Kimbell Foods recognized that federal mortgage programs, such as
the SBA and FmHA loan programs, may be national in scope yet not
"need" (in the strong sense) to displace state law.358 The Supreme Court
held that state laws of lien priority should be incorporated as the applica-
ble federal law. Federal mortgage programs which permit individual ne-
gotiation of the terms and conditions of the loan359 reveal that national
uniformity is merely a desirable, rather than an essential, characteristic
of the program. Also suggesting the lack of an essential requirement for
uniformity are judicial decisions which hold that state law is displaced
but nonetheless grants a remedy to the debtor, under the equitable power
of the court, substantially identical to what state law would have
provided.360
This confusion between what is a necessary basis for uniformity and
what is convenient or efficient is reflected in the widely disparate conclu-
sions of the appellate courts in virtually every area of substantive law in
real estate finance. There is no agreement whatsoever on whether the
availability of a deficiency judgment, 361 a binding foreclosure without
354. The Multifamily Housing Foreclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. III, 95 Stat. 422
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3701 (1985)); see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
355. Whitehead v. Derwinski, 904 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States
v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)).
356. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
357. Compare Whitehead, 904 F.2d at 1372 (holding that VA waived right to a deficiency
by choosing power of sale foreclosure) with Jones v. Turnage, 699 F. Supp. 795, 799-800 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) (holding that state law is preempted and deficiency is permitted because state an-
tideficiency laws did not give VA an option), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Derwinski, 914 F.2d 1496
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1309 (1991).
358. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
359. See, eg., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1966); United States v. Stew-
art, 523 F.2d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975).
360. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
350 [Vol. 71
REAL ESTATE FINANCE
right of redemption, 362 or consistent notice requirements363 constitute a
sufficient justification for imposed national uniformity. The split in the
appellate courts on the enforceability of a contractual waiver of state
laws indicates that it may be one thing to displace a state debtor protec-
tion law, but yet another to override state policies underlying nonwaiv-
able rights.3 "
If implied preemption of state real estate finance laws is to be based
upon a need for national uniformity, the doctrine will result only in in-
consistent and unpredictable results. The loose texture of such a stan-
dard and the considerable inconsistency in results among the
jurisdictions undermine the very attempt to achieve uniformity.
5. Frustration of Federal Program Objectives
The possibility that enforcement of a state law could frustrate the
specific objectives of a federal program is the second criterion common to
both the implied preemption test 365 and federal common law doctrine.
366
It also appears as a functional restatement of the conflict preemption
analysis, 367 or as a different expression of the goal of protecting federal
financial interests.
368
When congressional action involves market regulation of real estate
finance, as opposed to direct market participation, the possibility that
state laws could frustrate the objectives of the federal laws certainly ex-
ists, but potential frustration has not been problematic for two reasons.
First, the federal laws frequently address the scope of the preemptive
effect in express terms or delegate a determination of the issue.369 See-
362. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 211-20 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text. "[Clontractual provisions do not have
the force of federal law and do not foreclose the question of what the federal rule is." United
States v. Pastos, 781 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996,
999 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979)).
365. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (determining whether state law "stand[s]
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress" in preemption analysis).
366. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (establishing as a crite-
rion whether "state laws frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs").
367. Chicago & N.W. Trans. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311,317 (1981); Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649-52 (1971); see supra notes 311-17 and accompanying text.
368. Jones v. Turnage, 699 F. Supp. 795, 802 (N.D. Cal. 1988) ("While the cost of the
federal program is not a controlling factor in determining whether a uniform federal rule
should apply it may be considered in determining whether federal objectives are frustrated by
adoption of state law."), aff'd sub non. Jones v. Derwinski, 914 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1309 (1991); see supra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
369. See 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (1988) (setting forth scope of preemption of Real Estate Settle-
ment Procedures Act, and delegating authority to Secretary to determine inconsistencies with
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ond, it is much easier to recognize a conflict between the state and federal
requirements when specific conduct is required or prohibited under the
laws.
370
When, however, the congressional action takes the form of direct
market participation, as in the federal mortgage programs, the govern-
ment's role as a secured creditor carries with it the additional objective of
recovering the indebtedness. As previously noted,371 the protection of
federal financial interests alone is insufficient to justify implied preemp-
tion in this context.372 In specific contexts, such as the applicability of
local rent control laws to HUD programs 373 or the management of feder-
ally insured projects, 374 state or local laws may frustrate the program's
objectives in ways other than simply impeding recovery of the debt.
A conceptual difficulty with heavy reliance on "federal program
objectives" is that it effectively destroys any balance which a state may
have achieved in the allocation of rights and duties among debtors and
creditors. Federal agencies seek displacement of state mortgage laws
when it is to the financial benefit of the federal agency as a creditor. The
same agencies argue that debtors are left to "state law remedies available
to protect mortgagors from unconscionable mortgages. 375 Yet if state
state law); 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1988) (setting forth scope of preemption of Truth in Lending
Act, and delegating authority to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to
determine inconsistencies).
370. See Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Empie, 778 F.2d 1447, 1454 (10th Cir. 1985)
(holding that state law prohibiting use of term "bank" by institutions not state-chartered di-
rectly conflicts with Home Owners' Loan Act); Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 281 Or. 533, 540, 577 P.2d 477, 483 (1978) (finding no actual conflict between
FHLBB regulations and state laws concerning tax and insurance escrows), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1051 (1978).
371. See supra notes 327-36 and accompanying text.
372. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1966) ("The United States, as sover-
eign, has certain preferences and priorities, but neither Congress nor this Court has ever as-
serted that they are absolute."). The Supreme Court distinguished the revenue production
purpose of federal tax lien laws from federally insured mortgage programs, stating: "We be-
lieve that had Congress intended the private commercial sector, rather than taxpayers in gen-
eral, to bear the risks of default entailed by these public welfare programs, it would have
established a priority scheme displacing state law." United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440
U.S. 715, 735 (1979).
373. See City of Boston v. Harris, 619 F.2d 87, 94 (Ist Cir. 1980) ("Federal regulation of
rents accord [sic] the government a voice in securing the economic viability of federally subsi-
dized insured housing.").
374. See United States v. Haddon Haciendas Co., 541 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1976)
("[Here the federal interest cannot be characterized simply as the protection of the federal
fise.... The purpose is to deter the exploitive management of federally-insured projects and
the resulting substandard and slum-like housing conditions that the NHA was designed to
eliminate.").
375. Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692, 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982) (quot-
ing Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 1977)). In a manner directly
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law remedies are preempted as conflicting with federal program objec-
tives, the government, as secured creditor, is indeed left with ample fed-
eral rights while the debtor is left with no protections. Consistent with
this doctrinal bias, the same federal agencies strenuously argue that fed-
eral statutes, regulations, and policies do not create a private cause of
action against the federal agency.376
6. Disruption of Commercial Relationships
Evaluating the potential impact on commercial relationships predi-
cated on state law is the most significant distinction between the criteria
used under implied preemption doctrine and federal common law. This
analysis is the distinctive feature and major contribution of Kimbell
Foods.37 7 It recognizes that state laws may be a web of intimately and
intricately related provisions. To preempt but one state law may tear the
web, undermine stability, and thwart expectations of ongoing commer-
cial relationships.
378
Kimbell Foods held that federal law applied to contractual liens aris-
ing from federal loan programs, but state law should be incorporated as
the governing law to determine the relative priority of such liens.379
"Developing priority rules on a case-by-case basis, depending on the
types of competing private liens involved, leaves creditors without the
definite body of law they require in structuring sound business transac-
tions.' '38  This requirement that a court consider the impact on commer-
cial relationships by displacement of state law has led the majority of
courts since Kimbell Foods to conclude that state laws should be adopted
as the applicable federal law in the area of lien priority.38' Even in this
particular context, however, the results have not been uniform.
In the context of state antideficiency laws, 382 state statutory rights of
redemption,383 state laws concerning contractual waivers,384 and state
contrary to Shimer, the Ninth Circuit concluded, "[lilt [is] most improbable that the VA Act
was intended to authorize the federal courts to create, with respect to the area of VA-guaran-
teed home loans, a federal common law of mortgages to supplement or supplant the law pro-
vided by the states." Id. The only possible reconciliation of Rank with Shimer is a rationale
that Congress intended to confer upon the VA all rights and to strip the debtors of all
remedies.
376. Id.
377. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979).
378. Id. at 739.
379. Id. at 718.
380. Id. at 739 n.42.
381. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 171-74, 186-87 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
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notice requirements, 385 courts have displayed, since the decision in Kim-
bell Foods, an increasing reluctance to displace state law. Nonetheless, in
each substantive area courts have still reached opposite conclusions on
identical issues.
There are several possible explanations for this lack of consistency.
One is that a number of jurisdictions have chosen not to apply the
Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods line of reasoning concerning federal
common law, and instead have followed implied preemption analysis de-
rived from Shimer.38 6 The reasoning in Shimer not only failed to consider
the impact of preemption on state commercial relationships, but ignored
entirely the equally applicable Clearfield Trust line of decisions.38 7 A
second explanation is that courts have reached different conclusions
about separate factors, such as the existence of a conflict,388 or the signifi-
cance of a separate state policy prohibiting contractual waivers.389
An additional explanation for the lack of consistency following
Kimbell Foods is the illusive nature of the requirement to consider the
impact of preemption on commercial relationships. For example, one
court has limited the application of Kimbell Foods only to commercial
relationships involving third parties and excluded its application to par-
ties in a direct contractual relationship with the federal government.390
Although plausible in concept, such a limitation finds little support in the
reasoning of Kimbell Foods, which addressed "settled commercial prac-
tices" in general and the impact of the government's relationships di-
rectly with its debtors in particular. 91
While the addition of this critical factor of the potential impact on
existing state laws and commercial relationships has required courts to
evaluate the adverse consequences of preemption on state policies, it has
384. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 211-28 and accompanying text.
386. 367 U.S. 374, 379-81 (1961).
387. In three decisions, rendered after Kimbell Foods, it was held that state statutory rights
of redemption were preempted, but no reference was made to Kimbell Foods. United States v.
Victory Highway Village, Inc., 662 F.2d 488, 498 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Curry, 561
F. Supp. 429, 430 (D. Kan. 1983); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bruening Farms Corp.,
537 F. Supp. 936, 938 (N.D. Iowa 1982).
388. Compare United States v. Vallejo, 660 F. Supp. 535, 538-39 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (ap-
plying state antideficiency law after finding no conflict with federal law) with Jones v. Turnage,
699 F. Supp. 795, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (preempting state antideficiency law), aff'd sub. nom.
Jones v. Derwinski, 914 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1309 (1991).
389. Compare Curry, 561 F. Supp. at 430 (enforcing a contractual waiver) with United
States v. Pastos, 781 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that a contractual waiver of state
laws is not binding on federal court).
390. United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 284, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1988).
391. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739, 739-40 & n.43 (1979).
[Vol. 71
REAL ESTATE FINANCE
not achieved uniformity in interpretation or application. As is true with
all other relevant criteria for both forms of implied preemption analysis,
there is no predicative significance to these factors, resulting in chaos
among jurisdictions and within jurisdictions.
C. Recent Approaches to Federal Common Law and Implied
Preemption
Recent scholarship on implied preemption and federal common law
has largely ignored real estate finance. Whether this is due to the historic
view that property law and real estate finance are matters peculiar to
state law, or is simply a reflection of an academic preoccupation with
constitutional allocations of power, there has been very little attention to
this area since the economic collapse of the 1930s.392 Leading constitu-
tional treatises provide little, if any, analysis of Shimer, Yazell, Kimbell
Foods, or Clearfield Trust, the dominant Supreme Court opinions which
bear on the relationship between federal and state real estate finance
laws. 393 Basic works on federal courts and federal jurisdiction provide
slightly more analysis,394 but even in these texts the discussion tends to
focus on the issue of the authority of federal common law rather than its
content. Conversely, with one exception,395 scholarship in real estate fi-
nance has tended to be issue-specific in nature.3 96 The task, therefore, is
to develop a coherent doctrine of preemption and federal common law
which acknowledges both historic diversity among states and the com-
plexity of interwoven rights and duties of debtors and creditors. Three
possible approaches to preemption and federal common law which have
been discussed in recent years in analogous contexts-the "enclave"
analysis, the "substantial effect" test, and the "congressional directive"
approach-all fall short of providing the needed conceptual clarity.
392. An otherwise comprehensive and insightful work which traces the growth of federal
preemption over the past 60 years, JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE
SILENT REVOLUTION (1991), omits entirely any discussion of preemption in real estate
finance.
393. For example, NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 250, §§ 4.4-4.9, at 138-63, do not
discuss any of these cases, while TRIBE, supra note 250, does not discuss Shimer, Yazell, or
Kimbell Foods, and cites Clearfield Trust only in passing. Id. § 3.23, at 159 n.24.
394. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 854-69 (3d ed. 1988); see, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 276, §§ 6.1-6.2.3,
at 293-309.
395. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 26, § 11.6, at 811-25.
396. For example, controversy surrounding federal regulatory preemption of due-on-sale
clauses prompted an extensive range of scholarship within a short period of time. See id.
§ 5.20, at 316 n.9.
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1. Real Estate Finance as an "Enclave"
One recurring approach to the analysis of displacement of state law
by federal common law or implied preemption is that there are certain
"enclaves" which are particularly appropriate for uniform federal law.
These have been identified as interstate and international disputes, admi-
ralty, and the rights and obligations of the United States.397 Conversely,
there are areas in which states have been left largely autonomous, such as
family law.3 98 For present purposes, in real estate finance the question is
not whether federal courts have the power to displace state law but
whether, and when, the choice to exercise such power should be made.399
Real property laws have traditionally received strong deference as a
subject matter peculiar to the domain of state sovereignty. Even the
threshold opinion seeking to establish the broad sweep of federal com-
mon law, Swift v. Tyson,'" recognized the application of state law "to
rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights
and titles to real estate." 1 Over one hundred years later, in Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corp. v. Beaver County,' 2 the Supreme Court again recog-
nized that "[c]oncepts of real property are deeply rooted in state
traditions, customs, habits and laws." 3 Beaver County involved the
question whether state definitions of real property, for ad valorem taxa-
tion purposes, should be applicable to fixtures owned by a governmental
agency. As long as such state laws were not discriminatory against the
federal government, the Court held, "settled state rules as to what consti-
tutes 'real property' " would control. 4°4
The emergence over the past sixty years, however, of the secondary
mortgage market, of uniform residential mortgage instruments, and of
increased federal intervention in the substantive terms of mortgage lend-
ing renders the "enclave" approach no longer viable today; some aspect
397. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1980); Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964).
398. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 353 (1966) (noting the "peculiarly state
province of family [and] family-property arrangements"); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570,
580 (1956) ("[T]here is no federal law of domestic relations .... ").
399. As Professor Field has observed, the issue is not so much whether there is a constitu-
tional reservation to the states of authority in certain areas, but "whether there has been a
federal decision---constitutional, congressional, or judicial-to assume responsibility for law-
making in an area." Field, supra note 272, at 979-80.
400. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
401. Id. at 18.
402. 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
403. Id. at 210.
404. Id. Significantly, the Court expressly rejected the argument for national uniformity by
pointing out that Congress, in permitting local taxation of real property, "made it impossible
to apply the law with uniform tax consequences in each state and locality." Id. at 209.
[Vol. 71
REAL ESTATE FINANCE
of federal law is inexorably involved in virtually every real estate financ-
ing transaction. Despite these developments, however, one must recog-
nize that real estate finance is a highly complex system of rules which
evolved differently in each jurisdiction and which underlie the expecta-
tions of all parties in each jurisdiction." 5 In the analogous context of
determining the legal definition of "children," the Supreme Court con-
cluded that when state law defines the relationships of parties, it is appro-
priate to incorporate state law definitions of the parties themselves." 6
2. Substantial Effect on Program Operations
An approach which has emerged over the last twenty years suggests
that, when "the issue's outcome bears some relationship to a federal pro-
gram, no rule may be applied which would not be wholly in accord with
that program." 7 Unfortunately, this suggestion is misleading in several
respects and offers little clarity if taken at face value. If followed liter-
ally, no state law would apply to federal mortgage loan programs except
those laws which furthered the ability of the federal government to col-
lect on such loans. This suggestion, found in United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co., must be read in the context of the underlying facts in
which a state statute expressly attempted to abrogate, or unilaterally re-
vise, the property rights of only the federal government and not private
parties. In rejecting the application of state law, the Supreme Court sim-
ply applied the exception, recognized in Beaver County," 9 that deference
to state real property laws is appropriate only so long as there is no af-
firmative discrimination against the federal government.41°
405. "The presumption that state law should be incorporated into federal common law is
particularly strong in areas in which private parties have entered legal relationships with the
expectation that their rights and obligations would be governed by state-law standards."
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1717 (1991) (citing Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946)).
406. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956).
407. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 604 (1972) (quoting with
approval Mishkin, supra note 272, at 805-06); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 276, § 6.2, at
303-04.
408. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. at 604.
409. 328 U.S. at 210.
410. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. at 596. Both Justices Stewart and Rehnquist
rejected the appropriateness of an invocation of federal common law, preferring instead to
reject the state statute as an unconstitutional retroactive impairment of contractual obliga-
tions, or as discriminatory against the federal government. Both Justices argued that federal
common law should not apply.
It seems clear to me, as a matter of law, not a matter of "choice" or "borrowing,"
that when anyone, including the Federal Government, goes into a State and acquires
real property, the nature and extent of the rights created are to be determined, in the
absence of a specifically applicable statute, by the law of the State.
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The original statement appears first in Professor Mishkin's leading
essay on federal common law.411 However, to read the suggestion as a
result-oriented preference for whatever rule benefits the federal govern-
ment's interest is to take the proposition out of context.412 The basic
thrust of Professor Mishkin's analysis calls into question a simplistic in-
terpretation of the Clearfield Trust analysis which suggests that when-
ever the federal government is a party, federal uniform rules should be
applied. Mishkin argues, quite forcefully, that such analysis "can have
one of two possible results: either it provides only the illusion of uni-
formity, or it achieves its substance-for the Government-by the pro-
cess of passing the burdens onto private shoulders." '413
Indeed, the chaos which has resulted from the selective application
of federal common law rules to federal mortgage programs has proved
Mishkin's thesis rather than undermined it. As he correctly anticipated,
incorporation of well-developed state laws provides greater predictability
in real estate finance than do isolated federal rules which may result in
loss of predictability and uniformity.4 14
3. Congressional Directive
A superficially attractive approach to the determination of applica-
ble rules in real estate finance is to require a congressional directive.415
Such an approach could take several forms. If "congressional directive"
is taken in the strong sense to mean an express declaration of the rights
and duties of the parties, either in the form of express preemption or
express incorporation of state law, clarity and uniformity are indeed
Id. at 605 (Stewart, J., concurring).
[T]he interest of the Federal Government in having real property acquisitions that it
makes in the States pursuant to a particular federal program governed by a similarly
uniform rule is too tenuous to invoke the Clearfield Trust principle, especially in light
of the consistent statements by this Court that state law governs real property
transactions.
Id. at 607 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
411. Mishkin, supra note 272, at 805-06; see supra note 407.
412. Professor Miskin's citation, at the conclusion of the suggestion, is to Beaver County's
discrimination exception to deference to state law. Mishkin, supra note 272, at 806 n.23.
413. Id. at 832.
414. Id.
415. Congressional directive, in this context, refers not so much to the underlying question
of the power or authority to create and apply federal common law, but rather to the content of
the rule itself. I concur with Professor Field's analysis that the traditional two-prong analysis
(of power and of content) is not helpful, and that an expansive or "permissive" reading of
federal common law authority is more accurate. See Field, supra note 272, at 885-88. Her
analysis of the "directive" approach pertained to the question of authority to create federal
common law. Id. at 934-42. In contrast, this section evaluates the "directive" approach solely
with respect to the question of the content of the federal rule.
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achieved.416 Unfortunately, however, in real estate finance an affirmative
decision to preempt all state laws would require enactment of a compre-
hensive code far exceeding in scope and complexity any recent federal
enactments in this area. Conversely, an express decision not to preempt
any state real estate finance laws ignores the intricacies of the secondary
mortgage market and existing federal legislation.
Alternatively, one could argue that displacement of state law
through implied preemption and federal common law should occur only
when Congress expressly directs the federal judiciary to develop the ap-
propriate federal rules. An express congressional directive for the courts
to determine the rules would not necessarily identify the relevant criteria
for formulating the rules, and the absence of such criteria would result in
inconsistency and unpredictability, unless the Supreme Court resolved all
questions.4" 7 If "congressional directive" is construed in the weak sense
of including implicit directives, whether derived from legislative history,
the scope of legislation, or the existence of regulations, the present lack of
clarity and predictability will continue. Although their focus has been
primarily on the question of the authority of federal courts to decide is-
sues as a matter of federal common law, leading commentators have ac-
cepted this weak sense of directive as sufficient guidance for determining
the content of federal law.4" 8 Judge Friendly has argued that "federal
courts must follow state decisions on matters of substantive law appro-
priately cognizable by the states whereas state courts must follow federal
decisions on subjects within national legislative power where Congress
has so directed."4 9 At the same time, however, he acknowledged that
416. Unless, of course, the congressional act itself permits states to override or otherwise
reject application of the congressional standard, which undercuts the very attempt at uniform-
ity. Such has been the case, to varying degrees, with many instances of express congressional
preemption in the area of real estate finance. See supra notes 108, 111, 118 and accompanying
text.
417. As noted by Judge Friendly almost 30 years ago, decisions on such an extensive range
of real estate issues by the United States Supreme Court are hardly likely under our current
judicial system. Friendly, supra note 272, at 406.
418. Professor Thomas Merrill offers an analytic framework by which to identify the criti-
cal questions. He suggests determining first, whether the issue involves a substantive rule of
decision; second, whether the applicable federal rule can be determined from conventional
textual interpretation; third, whether a federal rule is necessary to protect a federal policy; and
fourth, whether there is evidence of delegation to the federal courts of rule-making authority.
Merrill, supra note 277, at 46-47. Insofar as his thesis concerns the legitimacy of federal com-
mon law power, the framework is useful. Insofar, however, as the issue involves the content of
the federal common law rule, the analysis suffers the same difficulties as others, acknowledging
neither the significance of established and complex state law systems, nor the uncertainty
which results from a highly discretionary determination of the content of the federal rule.
419. Friendly, supra note 272, at 422.
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determining when Congress has directed a federal uniform rule is no easy
task:
The issue that must be determined in each instance is what
heed Congress intended to have paid to state law in an area
where no heed need constitutionally be paid-more realisti-
cally, in Gray's famous phrase, "to guess what it would have
intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point had
been present.
420
This weak sense of congressional directive thus offers little, if any, foun-
dation or guidelines for determining when displacement of state laws
should occur.
In a similar manner Professor Field has argued in favor of a broad
conception of federal common law authority, but has given little atten-
tion to the appropriate content of federal law.421 Although she states
that there is "a presumption in favor of using state law,",4 22 her analysis
mirrors the ambiguity of a flexible multifactored analysis:423 "[F]ederal
rules will be made when there is a need for national uniformity that out-
weighs the need for uniformity within a state; or when national interests
require. But state law should apply whenever that result is not inconsis-
tent with federal purposes."'424 If federal common law power is as exten-
sive as Professor Field argues and displacement of state law occurs
whenever there is a need for it, the only thing certain and predictable is
the complete lack of certainty and predictability in judicial determination
of need, the precise result evident today in real estate finance.
VI. A REVISED ANALYSIS
The addition of new, even more specific, criteria for determining
whether federal law does or should displace state laws in real estate fi-
nance will not clarify the chaos. Such criteria would likely only restate
the factors suggested thus far, would further increase judicial flexibility,
and would further decrease consistency and predictability. A balancing
test is simply not viable. Conversely, the interstitial law-making func-
tions of federal common law, and statutory interpretation functions of
implied preemption generally, are too vital to be rejected in their entirety.
420. Id. at 410 (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
173 (1963)).
421. See Field, supra note 272.
422. Id. at 950.
423. Professor Field identifies what she terms a "well-developed list of factors" including:
(1) the need for national uniformity, (2) the United States as a party, (3) developed state law
and intrastate uniformity, and (4) feasibility. Id. at 953-60.
424. Id. at 962.
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The clearest solution would entail an express congressional directive
either to incorporate state laws in all federal mortgage programs, or the
enactment of a comprehensive body of federal law governing all aspects
of debtor and creditor relationships in secured real estate transactions.
The problem with the former approach is that it fails to account for the
distinctive roles of the federal government as market regulator and as
market participant. The problem with the latter approach is that the
scope and depth of such legislation would require action well beyond
what Congress traditionally has enacted, and such action is not likely to
occur in the foreseeable future.
A coherent approach must recognize both the complex nature of
state real estate finance laws and the dual role of increased federal inter-
vention in real estate finance. The history of real estate finance is one of
continuing adjustments to the rights of debtors and creditors, with each
state developing a unique, complex allocation of such rights, resistant to
all attempts at interjurisdictional uniformity. Congressional action over
the past sixty years has taken two significantly different forms, market
regulation and market participation, each of which requires distinct ex-
planations and justifications for possible displacement of state laws. Be-
cause virtually every mortgage loan today is "federally related" in some
sense,425 the traditional criteria which point toward federal interests are
unworkable.
What is necessary to provide clarity and coherence in this area is an
acknowledgment that fundamental differences exist between congres-
sional action regulating the real estate finance market and federal partici-
pation in the market. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,426 the
Supreme Court recognized such a difference in deciding whether a state
plan to purchase scrap automobile products violated the Commerce
Clause. In the absence of congressional action, the Court held, the Com-
merce Clause does not prohibit a state "from participating in the market
and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others."427 Subse-
quently the Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that the distinc-
tion "between States as market participants and States as market
regulators makes good sense and sound law."428 While this distinction
developed in the context of Commerce Clause limitations on state pro-
grams and may well be "problematic" in that context,42 9 it offers a viable
method of constraining the application of federal common law to federal
425. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
426. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
427. Id. at 810.
428. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1979).
429. See TRIBE, supra note 250, § 6-11, at 432.
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mortgage programs while preserving the necessity for implied preemp-
tion in federal mortgage regulation.
When the federal government is acting as a market participant,
either as a direct mortgagee or as an insurer or guarantor of mortgage
loans, there should be no displacement of state laws except in the case of
a direct conflict with express congressional requirements. When the gov-
ernment is acting as a market regulator in real estate finance, state laws
may be displaced through an implied preemption analysis, but the rele-
vant criteria should be limited to the factors identified in Kimbell Foods.
This new approach does not alter the constitutional authority for federal
displacement of state law; it does significantly change, however, the dis-
cretionary exercise of this authority.
A. Federal Common Law and Market Participation
All federal mortgage programs share certain basic characteristics,
whether the federal agency is a direct mortgagee or an insurer or guaran-
tor of loans. First, the federal government is acting in the capacity of a
secured creditor, functionally identical to a private creditor. The only
differences may be the purposes of the loan (FmHA loans), the restricted
class of debtors (VA loans), or restrictions pertaining to use of the secur-
ity (HUD low-income housing loans). Second, the underlying transac-
tion relies largely on existing state law to identify, secure, and protect the
security. This includes reliance on state recording statutes, title examina-
tion procedures, and foreclosure requirements. Third, as a secured credi-
tor the federal government's interest is, at least in part, to maximize the
protection of its security and its ability to recover the indebtedness.
When the federal government is acting simply as a market participant
in real estate finance, and Congress has not expressly declared otherwise,
state law should apply to the transaction. The federal interest in protect-
ing the security and recovering the indebtedness is federal only because it
identifies the holder of the interest; it is not federal because of any attri-
bute of sovereignty.430 There is no inherent or obvious reason to displace
state law and create judicially a federal rule which prefers the position of
the government as creditor. To the contrary, when acting in the same
capacity as a private creditor, the federal government "should fare no
better, and no worse, than a private lender." '431
Only two exceptions should exist to this rule that state law applies in
430. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 734 (1979) ("[W]hen the
United States operates as a moneylending institution under carefully circumscribed programs,
its interest in recouping the limited sums advanced is of a different order.").
431. United States v. S.K.A. Assocs., Inc., 600 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1979).
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instances of federal market participation. The first arises when a direct
conflict between state law and the requirements of federal law exists.
Conflict here, however, refers only to the rare situation where it is func-
tionally impossible to comply with both the federal act and the state law.
A purported conflict with federal policy manuals or the purposes of the
federal program, for example, will not suffice to displace state law. A
conflict of state law requirements with federal regulations will suffice if
and only if the regulations flow from the congressional act as a matter of
necessity432 and not as a matter of administrative discretion.a 33 The sec-
ond exception occurs when applicable state law discriminates against the
federal government as a market participant. This exception simply af-
firms the proposition that state laws, as applied to the federal govern-
ment, must be nondiscriminatory in nature.434
This rule for the selection of applicable law, requiring selection of
state law in instances of federal participation, is certainly subject to the
authority of Congress to speak clearly and unequivocally on a precise
issue.435 Because the federal government's interest, in instances of mar-
ket participation, is synonymous with a creditor's interest, judicial deci-
sions based upon federal common law tend to select a rule which favors
the creditor. This ignores the complex state allocations of rights and du-
ties between creditors and debtors. Such a reallocation of rights, as a
matter of constitutional theory, is far more appropriately the responsibil-
ity of the legislative rather than the judicial branch of government.436 In
432. This "necessity" approach differs from the one considered, and rejected, by Professor
Field, for she evaluated it for purposes of ascertaining judicial power, not determining judicial
discretion in the content of the applicable law. Field, supra note 272, at 945-46.
433. This position is not inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Fidelity
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). See supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text. In de la Cuesta the Supreme Court applied an implied preemption analy-
sis to a context involving market regulation rather than market participation-federal regula-
tion of financial institutions. 458 U.S. at 153, 159, 167. While federal banking insurance
regulations may lie on a gradual plane which evolves from market regulation into market
participation, see infra notes 448-51 and accompanying text, there is no requirement that the
preemptive authority of federal regulations apply in instances of direct federal market
participation.
434. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 608 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
435. An example of such an affirmative statement by Congress, in the area of market par-
ticipation, is the establishment of uniform foreclosure procedures applicable to HUD multi-
family loan foreclosures. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
436. The Court has said:
It must be recognized that the factors supporting a federal rule of uniformity in this
field, and those militating against the dislocation of long-standing state procedures,
are full of competing considerations. They involve many imponderables which this
Court is ill-equipped to assess, on which Congress has not yet spoken, and which we
think are best left to that body to deal with in light of their full illumination.
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the analogous context of cases addressing the breadth of the Commerce
Clause, the Supreme Court has imposed a requirement of a "clear state-
ment" on Congress in order to achieve a stronger sense of such legislative
accountability.437 Clearfield Trust, which has been the basis for federal
common-law displacement of state laws when the government is a party,
largely ignored this proposition of legislative accountability.
4 38
B. Implied Preemption and Market Regulation
When congressional action takes the form not of direct market par-
ticipation but of market regulation, the issues change significantly. The
tendency toward decisions favoring the self-interest of the government as
a creditor is absent, and the action can be content-neutral, at least insofar
as no government agency is serving in a role equally played by private
parties. In this context the goal is not so much to constrain judicial dis-
cretion to preempt state laws by implication as it is to clarify the relevant
criteria for such preemption.
Implied preemption by governmental market regulation should occur
only when national uniformity is an essential characteristic of the congres-
sional action and when creation of a separate federal rule will not have a
significantly adverse impact on existing state laws and the relationships
predicated on such laws.
The first step in this two-part analysis consolidates the existing tests
employed to determine the question of implied preemption. It assumes
the existence of a conflict, narrowly construed, and follows the pattern of
the federal real estate finance disclosure laws in recognizing that states
are free to impose additional requirements, with federal action establish-
ing only minimum requirements. It rejects the "occupation of the field"
test because it is clear, at least in the context of real estate finance, that
Congress has not yet begun to exhaust the necessary regulation of this
field. Because the context is market regulation rather than market par-
ticipation, the two tests of "dominance of federal interest" and "frustra-
tion of federal program objectives" do not stand as separate tests, but
instead are subsumed into the test of the "need for national uniformity."
United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 251-52 (1960).
437. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971). "Congress must be prevented from
resorting to ambiguity as a cloak for its failure to accommodate the competing interests bear-
ing on the federal-state balance." TRIBE, supra note 250, § 5-8, at 317.
438. The Court thus ignored the need to ground federal policy in the specific inten-
tions of Congress. If the policy is not so grounded, then the states cannot be deemed
to have "acquiesced" in it, the elected representatives in Congress and the President
will not have passed upon it, and it cannot be said to be "required" by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States.
Merrill, supra note 277, at 38.
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In recent years the rationale of the need for national uniformity has
arisen primarily in market participation cases involving federal loan pro-
grams, leading to inconsistent results. Under this revised analysis, it
would not apply to market participation, but only to market regulation.
Whether there is in fact a need for national uniformity, in the strong
sense of an essential requirement, is more often than not evident from the
terms of the underlying federal legislation. When Congress, for example,
expressly permits states to override, or disclaim, substantive market regu-
lation, there is clear indication that while national uniformity may be
desirable, it is not essential.
The second step in this revised implied preemption analysis requires
an examination of the impact of creating a separate federal rule on ex-
isting state laws. Derived from Kimbell Foods,43 9 this inquiry injects into
implied preemption analysis a factor which has largely been missing.
Every issue in real estate finance, including deficiencies, rights of redemp-
tion, contractual waivers, notice requirements, receiverships, foreclosure
procedures, and lien priorities, is part of an intricate and complex system
of rights and remedies among creditors and debtors. A federal rule
should not displace or revise a single issue without consideration of the
consequent impact on this delicate balance. When the authority for dis-
placement of state law is by implication only, the reluctance to intervene
should be strong. This cautionary approach affirms not only the author-
ity of Congress to declare subsequently a national rule by express action,
but also the responsibility of the legislative branch to decide the scope of
federal and state decision-making in real estate finance.
C. When Regulation Becomes Participation
The conceptual division of market regulation and market participa-
tion inevitably breaks down in certain contexts, especially when the fed-
eral role combines the two functions. A primary example is when federal
banking regulations are transformed into direct federal participation by
virtue of conservatorship or receivership actions for failed financial insti-
tutions. In this context the Supreme Court has determined, in D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,'4 that federal common law displaces state laws.
Decided shortly before Clearfield Trust, D'Oench Duhme involved a
promissory note taken by a federally insured bank in which the bank and
the maker of the note agreed that the note would never be called and was
solely for the purpose of permitting the bank to carry it as an asset in lieu
of other defaulted loans. At issue was whether state or federal law ap-
439. 440 U.S. 715 (1979); see supra notes 377-81 and accompanying text.
440. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
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plied to the cause of action, and if federal law applied, whether the maker
was barred from raising certain state law defenses. The Court held that
federal law, as derived from the federal banking laws, was applicable, and
that in light of the "federal policy to protect [the FDIC], and the public
funds which it administers,"" 1 the maker of the note is estopped to raise
its defenses against the government. 442 This application of federal com-
mon law" was codified, in part, by the enactment in 1950 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act. 4 Although there may be a question whether
the codification supersedes the common-law decision," 5 there is no
question that all of the defenses available to the FDIC are now available
to the RTC." 6 The RTC is thus in a position, in resolving failed institu-
tions, to override state laws and proceed against the makers of notes
notwithstanding defenses of failure of consideration, fraud, and oral
agreements to the contrary." 7
Insofar as questions remain about applying state law to the activities
of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the RTC, or parallel entities, the dif-
ferential tests for market regulation and market participation do not fit
neatly. The reason is that in acting as a regulator, insurer, and receiver
of financial institutions the federal government's function is radically dif-
ferent from roles played by private market participants. While it is one
of the largest single holders of residential mortgages in the country,
44 8
the RTC holds this status not primarily as an ordinary market partici-
pant, but as a consequence of the now sovereign functions of resolving
failed thrift institutions." 9 It is appropriate, therefore, in such a blended
441. Id. at 457.
442. Id. at 459.
443. See id. at 465-75 (Jackson, J., concurring).
444. Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32
(1988 & Supp. 111990)). The present statutory parallel is 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988 & Supp.
11 1990).
445. See FSLIC v. Two Rivers Assocs., 880 F.2d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 1989) (D'Oench
Duhme is applicable to FSLIC in both corporate and receivership capacities); FDIC v. Mc-
Clanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 514 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) (12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) does not preclude appli-
cation of the D'Oench Duhme doctrine); Marsha Hymanson, Borrower Beware: D'Oench,
Duhme and Section 1823 Overprotect the Insurer When Banks Fail, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 253,
269-74 (1988). As Professor Tribe has observed, "[E]ven when Congress declares its preemp-
tive intent in express language, deciding exactly what it meant to preempt often resembles an
exercise in implied preemption analysis." TRIBE, supra note 250, § 6-26, at 481 n. 14.
446. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4) (Supp. 111990); see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dismuke, 746
F. Supp. 104, 105 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (applying D'Oench Duhme and § 1823(e) to the RTC).
447. Bauman v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1514-17 (11th Cir. 1991);
Wayne M. Josel, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management and the S&L Crisis,
59 FORDHAM L. REv. S339, S355-56 (1991).
448. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
449. Congressional action created the "new corporation, to be known as the Resolution
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role of regulation and participation, to permit displacement of state law
based upon the need to protect federal interests.45 0 Any displacement
still must be clearly grounded doctrinally either upon implied preemp-
tion as a form of statutory construction or upon federal displacement as a
matter of federal common law.a 51
D. Parallels with State Action Analysis
When the federal government is a direct market participant in mort-
gage programs, there is the possibility of doctrinal inconsistency among
implied preemption, federal common law, and constitutional due process
requirements. An expansive interpretation of federal common law in the
context of federal mortgage programs arguably requires an expansive ap-
plication of the governmental action doctrine (and consequent due pro-
cess requirements) in two ways. First, while the extensive nature of
federal regulations and policies may support an argument in favor of pre-
emption, it also supports the proposition that the governmental functions
are subject to due process requirements. Second, the judicial displace-
ment of state law with a federal common law rule may itself constitute
governmental action rendering the transaction subject to due process
requirements.
For example, the majority of jurisdictions recognize the validity of
nonjudicial power of sale foreclosures. In such proceedings subordinate
mortgagees and creditors are frequently entitled only to notice by publi-
cation. Where there is no other form of government involvement, the
Supreme Court has held that contractually authorized power of sale fore-
closures are not subject to constitutional due process notice require-
ments.452 When there is direct governmental involvement as the party
conducting the foreclosure, constitutional due process requirements are
applicable and any interested party whose identity is reasonably ascer-
tainable is entitled to "[n]otice by mail or other means as certain to en-
sure actual notice.,
453
Trust Corporation, to deal with failed thrift institutions." H. Conf. Rep. No. 222, 101th
Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432.
450. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1991) (inter-
preting FIRREA and the public's "very strong interest in efficient resolution" of issues to
support a trial court issuance of an affirmative injunction).
451. See Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 589 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (requiring
evidence of the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state law); Gaff v. FDIC,
919 F.2d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that federal common law governs FDIC in liquida-
tion of a bank).
452. Scott v. Paisley, 271 U.S. 632, 636 (1926).
453. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983).
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If all federal mortgage programs were identical in nature and were
held to constitute governmental action for purposes of due process re-
quirements, this doctrinal inconsistency would not occur. Instead, how-
ever, the nature of federal mortgage programs includes direct mortgage
lending with little or no private lending involvement, indirect mortgage
lending by virtue of loan insurance and guaranties, and federally related
secondary mortgage market entities such as FNMA, GNMA, and
FHLMC.454 Generally, the presence of a governmental entity as a direct
mortgage lender, such as FmHA,45 s has been a sufficient basis for appli-
cation of constitutional due process requirements. When the governmen-
tal role has been indirect, however, as in the case of VA-guaranteed
mortgages,456 HUD-subsidized mortgages,457 and mortgage foreclosures
by secondary mortgage market entities, 45 8 due process requirements have
been found to be inapplicable on the basis of insufficient governmental
involvement.
In determining whether there is sufficient governmental action to
require due process, the "nexus" between the governmental entity and
the lender actually conducting the foreclosure, 459 and the nature of the
activities undertaken by the governmental entity are considered.460 Pre-
cisely because the application of federal common law, in the context of
federal mortgage programs, is premised upon the significance of the gov-
ernment's role as a direct participant, it is difficult to see how there could
be an insufficient nexus for state action, and yet a sufficient basis for fed-
eral common law preemption of state law. This is precisely what has
occurred, however. Even though courts have concluded that the VA
guaranty program displaces state laws because the "regulatory scheme
[for VA related foreclosures], complete as it is in every detail, was in-
454. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 26, § 7.28, at 580-84.
455. Johnson v. United States Dep't of Agric., 734 F.2d 774, 782 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Ricker
v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133, 138 (D. Me.), order supplemented, 434 F. Supp. 1251 (D.
Me. 1976).
456. Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982).
457. Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1977).
458. Warren v. GNMA, 611 F.2d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847
(1980); Northrip v. FNMA, 527 F.2d 23, 30 (6th Cir. 1975); FNMA v. Scott, 548 S.W.2d 545,
549 (Mo. 1977).
459. Northrip, 527 F.2d at 30. Compare Miller v. Hartwood Apts., Ltd., 689 F.2d 1239,
1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that HUD § 8 tenants have no cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 because there was no governmental action, since apartments were privately operated)
with Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 923 (11th Cir.) (holding that
participation of state finance authority was sufficient basis for state action; thus, due process
requirements applied to eviction procedures), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
460. Warren v. Government Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 611 F.2d 1229, 1232 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980).
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tended to provide the whole and exclusive source of protection of the
interests of the Veterans Administration, '461 and "federal common law
requires that [the VA indemnity right] exist, '4 62 one court has concluded
"that foreclosure by a private lender of a mortgage in a federal [VA]
mortgage guaranty program does not involve federal action sufficient to
invoke the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 463 Perhaps rec-
ognizing implicitly this doctrinal inconsistency, a recent decision ac-
knowledged that "government participation in this type of [non-judicial]
foreclosure procedure raises serious due process questions."
'461
The more constrained application of implied preemption and federal
common law in real estate finance proposed in this Article would reduce
this potential for doctrinal inconsistency. A broad and permissive ap-
proach to displacement of state law on the basis of federal participation
and federal interests is inconsistent with a narrow interpretation of the
requisite federal involvement for governmental action. So long as there
remains a judicial tendency to find insufficient governmental action in
indirect federal mortgage programs to invoke due process, it is difficult to
justify displacing state laws on the basis of the same governmental inter-
ests.465 How a governmental agency can receive implicitly the mantle of
authority to displace state laws in the name of the Commerce Clause and
the Supremacy Clause, while simultaneously claiming the prerogative of
461. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381 (1961).
462. Jones v. Tumage, 699 F. Supp. 795, 802 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd sub nom Jones v.
Derwinski, 914 F.2d 1496 (1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1309 (1991).
463. Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692, 702 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982).
464. Vail v. Derwinski, 946 F.2d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Mortgage Assocs. v.
Cleland, 651 F.2d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Failure to give the [debtors] notice raises serious
due process questions in any attempt to saddle them with an increased deficiency."); United
States v. Murdock, 627 F. Supp. 272, 278 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (holding due process does apply to
VA authorized power of sale foreclosure); United States v. Whitney, 602 F. Supp. 722, 734
(W.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he V.A.'s right to indemnity is defeated in this situation, because of the
Government's intimate complicity in the violation of defendant's statutory and constitutional
rights.").
465. This proposition is not intended to suggest agreement in any form with the existing
judicial analysis concerning the presence or absence of sufficient governmental action to bring
due process requirements to bear on federally related mortgage programs. More simply it is
designed to point out the doctrinal inconsistencies. It is entirely possible, and doctrinally con-
sistent, for a court to conclude the absence of both governmental action (for due process re-
quirements) and the lack of need to displace state law. Conversely, a court could find, in a
doctrinally consistent manner, the presence of both sufficient governmental action (for due
process requirements) and a sufficient justification for displacement of state law. It would also
be conceptually consistent for a court to find that sufficient governmental action (for due pro-
cess requirements) exists, but that there is an insufficient basis for displacement of state law, so
long as the state law in question is not itself constitutionally defective. What is inconsistent is
a finding of no sufficient governmental action (for due process requirements) yet a finding that
state law is displaced by federal common law.
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relying upon constitutionally defective foreclosure procedures, is curious
at best.
VII. CONCLUSION
The rapidly expanding federal governmental involvement in real es-
tate finance requires doctrinal clarity to address the possible displace-
ment of state laws by federal laws. Each state has developed, over a
period of two centuries, a complex matrix of the rights and duties of
debtors and creditors in real estate finance transactions. No two states
are identical in their current real estate laws, and the lack of uniformity
poses obstacles for real estate finance. The fact of federal intervention in
real estate finance, however, cannot in and of itself be an adequate basis
for displacing state laws.
Express congressional preemption of state real estate finance laws
reflects the ability of Congress to override state law when it deems it
necessary and appropriate. It also reflects the tendency of Congress to
allow states the authority to override or supplement congressional re-
quirements. This congressional acknowledgment of state autonomy in
real estate finance itself demonstrates that uniformity among jurisdic-
tions may be desirable, but is not mandatory.
In their present forms, the implied preemption and federal common
law doctrines do not provide a solid and coherent basis to justify displac-
ing state real estate finance laws. When using multifactored tests which
rely heavily on questions of intent and policy, courts reach inconsistent,
if not contradictory, conclusions. The omnipresence of federal govern-
mental intervention does not embody an omniscient federal common law.
The need for clarity and predictability in real estate finance and the
complexity of state real estate finance laws require a significant revision
in the application of implied preemption and federal common law. This
Article proposes that when the federal government is acting simply as a
market participant in real estate finance, and Congress has not expressly
declared otherwise, state law should apply to the transaction. Implied
preemption by governmental market regulation should occur only when
national uniformity is an essential characteristic of the congressional ac-
tion and when creation of a separate federal rule will not have a signifi-
cant adverse impact on existing state laws and relationships predicated
on such laws. This new approach will recognize the complex and deli-
cate balances in each state of creditor and debtor rights in real estate
finance, will affirm the authority of each state to regulate such balance in
the absence of express congressional declaration to the contrary, and will
provide a clearer and more predictable application of the laws governing
real estate finance.
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